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O'Sullivan v. Boerckel and the Default of State Prisoners'
Federal Claims: Comity or Tragedy?
Since 1867, state prisoners have had only two means by which to
raise federal claims in a federal forum-direct review by the Supreme
Court and federal habeas review.' Because the volume of cases heard
by the Supreme Court sharply declined in 1925 when Congress
established the discretionary docket,2 federal habeas corpus became
the only opportunity for the vast majority of state prisoners to raise
such claims. Despite the limitations that the discretionary docket has
imposed on state prisoners seeking Supreme Court review, Congress
consistently has maintained the importance of preserving state
prisoners' access to a federal forum through the writ of habeas
corpus Federal review is important because, in addition to providing
relief to prisoners who are imprisoned contrary to the laws of the
United States, it ensures both the uniformity of federal law4 and state
enforcement of federal laws that the states otherwise might not have
an incentive to enforce.5
Despite both the vital interests served by federal habeas review
and the fact that habeas review has been instrumental in curing
constitutional defects in state criminal cases,6 the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts have limited the writ severely, ostensibly in the
interest of federalism and the finality of state criminal proceedings.
7
1. See Judiciary Act of 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, 385 (1867). Habeas corpus is a
form of collateral attack whereby a federal court determines whether a defendant is being
imprisoned unconstitutionally. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 709 (6th ed. 1990).
2. In 1925, Congress passed legislation stating that all requests for Supreme Court
review would be discretionary, except for the review of state court decisions striking
federal laws or upholding state laws pursuant to the United States Constitution. See Act
of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, § 237,43 Stat. 936, 937 (1925).
3. Congress has reformed habeas corpus repeatedly, but generally has espoused the
principle that federal claims should be reviewed in a federal forum. See infra notes 42-92
(discussing the congressional development of the writ).
4. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264,415-16 (1821).
5. See Larry W. Yackle, Explaining Habeas Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 991, 1031-32
(1985) (explaining that a state's interest in enforcing state criminal law conflicts with the
protection of federal rights).
6. Since 1976, federal judges have found constitutional error in approximately 40%
of the death penalty cases that they have reviewed. See Jill Smolowe, Must This Man
Die?, TME, May 18,1992, at 40, 42.
7. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (indicating that overturning a
state decision because the State cannot prove that an error is harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt undermines state sovereignty and the State's interest in finality);
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Federal-state relations have always, to some extent, concerned both
the Court and Congress. This concern has prompted the judiciary
and Congress to develop two chief doctrines-exhaustion and
procedural default-to ensure that the federal courts respect state
sovereignty." Nevertheless, many commentators and judges have
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991) (recognizing that failure to respect state
procedural rules does significant harm to state interests in finality); McClesky v. Zant, 499
U.S. 467, 491 (1991) (indicating that granting successive petitions strikes both at the
finality of state criminal judgments and state sovereignty); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288,
309 (1989) ("Application of constitutional rules not in existence at the time a conviction
became final seriously undermines the principle of finality which is essential to the
operation of our criminal justice system."); Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986)
(noting that the "congruence between the standards for appellate and trial default reflects
our judgment that concerns for finality and comity are virtually identical regardless of the
timing of the defendant's failure to comply with legitimate state rules of procedure");
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1986) (indicating that the accuracy, efficiency,
and finality of state judgments necessitate that the inadvertent default of an issue on state
appeal precludes federal review); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 452-54 (1986)
(balancing the prisoner's interests in access to a federal forum against the state's interests
in the finality of the criminal law); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983) (indicating
that after direct review "a presumption of finality and legality attaches to the conviction
and sentence" and that the role of federal habeas, "while important in assuring that
constitutional rights are observed, is secondary and limited"); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107,
127-28 (1982) (indicating that the writ undermines the finality of criminal litigation, the
prominence of the state trial, and state sovereignty); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522
(1982) (holding that the complete dismissal of habeas petitions that contain both
exhausted and unexhausted claims promotes the principle of comity); Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465, 491 n.31 (1976) (stating that Fourth Amendment claims may not be heard if the
state afforded the defendant an opportunity for full and fair litigation, in part, because
habeas corpus, especially for guilty defendants, seriously undermines the finality of
criminal trials and the interests of federalism); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,
254-56 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring) (explaining that respect for the finality of state
decisions necessitates that Fourth Amendment claims be heard on habeas only if the
petitioner was not afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate in a state forum, which is
the rule that subsequently was adopted in Stone v. Powell); see also Paul M. Bator, Finality
in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441,
444-53 (1963) (discussing the importance of finality in criminal law).
8. Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 252-53 (1886), first enunciated the exhaustion
requirement; Congress codified the requirement more than 60 years later. See 28
U.S.C.A. § 2254(b), (c) (West 1994). The requirement is based on the logic that the
relationship between the state and federal governments necessitates that the federal
government refrain from adjudicating federal claims while a state forum is available to the
petitioner. See Royall, 117 U.S. at 251-52. Giving state courts the first opportunity to
adjudicate federal claims efficiently dispenses with many claims before they even reach the
federal courts, see Exparte Spencer, 228 U.S. 652, 660 (1913), and serves to minimize the
friction between state and federal courts, see Royall, 117 U.S. at 251-52. If the defendant
has available state remedies, he may not raise the claim on habeas. See O'Sullivan v.
Boerckel, 119 S. Ct. 1728, 1737 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting). To give teeth to the
exhaustion requirement, the Court developed the companion procedural default doctrine.
Thus, the procedural default doctrine penalizes the petitioner for not giving the state court
a fair opportunity to adjudicate the federal claim. See O'Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. at 1737
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Without the procedural default doctrine, a petitioner could
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viewed the Rehnquist Court's preoccupation with federalism as mere
pretext for a wholesale assault on federal habeas relief. The Court's
recent decision in O'Sullivan v. BoerckelP0 is one more weapon in the
Court's arsenal.
In June 1999, the Supreme Court held in O'Sullivan that Darren
Boerckel, a state prisoner, was procedurally barred from presenting
three claims in his federal habeas corpus petition because he had not
fulfilled the exhaustion requirement." This Note first examines the
procedural posture and holding of O'Sullivan." Next, it traces the
congressional history of the writ of habeas corpus1 3 and the judicial
history of the exhaustion and procedural default doctrines.14 This
Note then explores O'Sullivan's departure from these well-
established judicial principles.15  Next, in attempting to explain the
decision, the Note explores whether the decision in O'Sullivan
advances the traditional interests of comity and federalism. 6 Because
O'Sullivan apparently disregards prior case law and disrespects state
sovereignty,17 the Note explores the possibility that the decision is
satisfy the exhaustion requirement simply by waiting until a state forum was no longer
available and then seeking relief in federal court. See Spencer, 228 U.S. at 660. Since
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90-91 (1977) (holding that a failure to exhaust will not
bar federal review so long as the defendant had cause for the default and will suffer actual
prejudice therefrom), the Court increasingly has used the procedural default rule to
foreclose federal habeas review to petitioners who have failed to avail themselves of a
state remedy. See, e.g., Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (indicating that a
failure to raise a claim because of counsel inadvertence, not rising to the level of
ineffective assistance of counsel, does not constitute "cause" under Sykes); Engel v. Isaac,
456 U.S. 107, 130 (1982) (indicating that failure to make an argument because of its
supposed futility does not constitute "cause" under Sykes).
9. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 758-59 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that the
majority is on a "crusade to erect petty procedural barriers in the path of any state
prisoner seeking review of his federal constitutional claims"); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S.
407, 418 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("With this [decision], the Court has finally
succeeded in its thinly veiled crusade to eviscerate Congress's habeas corpus regime.");
Emanuel Margolis, Habeas Corpus: The No-Longer Great Writ, 98 DICK. L. REV. 557,
623 (1994); cf. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 541 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T~he
Court has lost its way in a procedural maze of its own creation" and "grossly misevaluated
the requirements of 'law and justice.'" (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1994))); Barry
Friedman, Failed Enterprise: The Supreme Court's Habeas Reform, 83 CAL. L. REV. 485,
546 (1995) (indicating that the Court's habeas reform has failed to advance its stated goals
of federalism and finality of state convictions).
10. 119 S. Ct. 1728 (1999).
11. See id. at 1734.
12. See infra notes 21-37 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 42-92 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 97-179 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 180-200 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 201-23 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 180-223 and accompanying text.
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explained more properly as an expression of judicial hostility to
habeas corpus in general. 8  Lastly, this Note discusses the
problematic nature of judicially determined habeas policy 9 and the
judicial disregard of the interests served by litigating federal claims in
a federal forum.2
In 1977, Darren Boerckel was convicted in Illinois for burglary,
rape, and aggravated battery." On appeal, Boerckel argued that his
confession should have been suppressed,n that prosecutorial
misconduct tainted his conviction, that the prosecutor committed a
Brady violation,2 and that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the
conviction.24 After the Illinois Court of Appeals affirmed his
conviction, Boerckel filed a petition for discretionary review to the
state supreme courtY The rules of Illinois appellate procedure, while
not listing exhaustively the types of claims generally reviewed, suggest
that only extraordinary claims will be considered on discretionary
reviewl Although Boerckel had raised what he thought to be his
claims of greatest significance, the Illinois Supreme Court denied him
relief.27
After the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari,
Boerckel applied to federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus.29
In his petition to the district court, Boerckel raised three claims not
18. See infra notes 224-31 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 232-41 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 241-69 and accompanying text.
21. See O'Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. at 1730.
22. See id. Boerckel argued that the confession should have been suppressed because
it "was the fruit of an illegal arrest, the confession was coerced," and "he had not
knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights." Id.
23. See id at 1731; see also Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that a
prosecution's suppression of requested evidence that is favorable to an accused violates
due process when the evidence is material to guilt or punishment).
24. See O'Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. at 1730.
25. See id.
26. The relevant portion of the statute provides:
The following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the court's
discretion, indicate the character of reasons which will be considered: the
general importance of the question presented; the existence of a conflict between
the decision sought to be reviewed and a decision of the Supreme Court, or of
another division of the Appellate Court; the need for the exercise of the Supreme
Court's supervisory authority; and the final or interlocutory character of the
judgment sought to be reviewed.
ILL. S. CT. RULE 315(a).
27. See O'Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. at 1730.
28. Illinois v. Boerckel, 385 N.E.2d 815 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979), cert denied, 447 U.S. 911
(1980).
29. See O'Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. at 1730.
2000] 1607
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
included in his petition for review to the Illinois Supreme Court: (1)
that he had not knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights;
(2) that his confession was involuntary; and (3) that the evidence was
insufficient to sustain his conviction? ° The district court held that
Boerckel's failure to raise these three claims before the Illinois
Supreme Court barred federal review. 3' On appeal, the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court, holding that
Boerckel was not required to present these claims in his petition to
the state supreme court to satisfy the exhaustion requirement?2
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and
reversed the court of appeals, holding that failure to raise claims in
petitions for discretionary review to a state's highest court
procedurally bars federal courts from entertaining such claims.33 In
explaining its ruling, the Court noted that the states may freely
reverse the presumption that claims not raised on discretionary
review are defaulted in federal court by explicitly indicating that
discretionary review is not available for such claims? 4 The Court held
that discretionary review was a remedy available to Boerckel and that
failure to raise claims on discretionary review violates the exhaustion
requiement.35 When Boerckel raised his claims in federal court, the
30. See id. Each of these claims had already been adjudicated by the state court of
appeals before Boerckel petitioned for discretionary review.
31. See id. at 1731.
32- See id.; Boerckel v. O'Sullivan, 135 F.3d 1194, 1202 (7th Cir. 1998), cert granted,
525 U.S. 1999 (1998), rev'd, 119 S. Ct. 1728 (1999).
33. See O'Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. at 1732-33.
34. See id. at 1734.
35. See id. at 1732-33. The habeas statute provides that the state prisoner has not
satisfied the exhaustion requirement "if he has the right under the law of the State to raise,
by any available procedure, the question presented." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c) (1994). The
Court, however, has not interpreted this provision literally. For example, a state prisoner
is not required to seek collateral review, see Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 447 (1953), or
extraordinary remedies that generally have not been successful in the past, see Wilwording
v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 249-50, 252 (1971) (per curiam). Wilwording reversed a lower
court's dismissal because the prisoner had not invoked a suit for injunction, a writ of
prohibition or mandamus, a state declaratory judgment, or relief under the State
Administrative Procedure Act, and the Court indicated that the prisoner's failure to avail
himself of a state remedy with a limited possibility of success does not necessarily bar
federal review. See id. Similarly, the state prisoner need not petition the United States
Supreme Court on certiorari to preserve an issue for habeas review. See Fay v. Noia, 372
U.S. 391, 435-38 (1963), overruled in part by Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). The
Court's holding in O'Sullivan is arguably inconsistent with Fay. Assuming that review on
certiorari is not required because it is discretionary and therefore rarely successful,
requiring the same sort of review at the state level makes little sense. See Amicus Curiae
Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in Support of the
Respondent at 2, O'Sullivan (No. 97-2048), available in 1999 WL 50221. Since 1990, the
Illinois Supreme Court has granted discretionary review in only three percent to six
1608 [Vol. 78
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time had lapsed for filing another petition for discretionary review
within the state system.36 Despite the time limitations that precluded
Boerckel from pursuing additional state remedies, the Court found
that his claims had been procedurally defaulted because he had failed
to comply with the exhaustion requirement.37
O'Sullivan raises questions about the judiciary's proper role in
shaping habeas corpus review. The modem writ of habeas corpus is
the product of both federal statutes and judicial interpretations.
Some observers have viewed judicial expansion and restriction of the
writ as an improper assumption of legislative power.39 Despite the
criticisms of judicial attempts at legislation, the Supreme Court has
been instrumental in defining the availability and the scope of the
writ.40 Likewise, despite an eager judiciary, Congress amply has
demonstrated its authority to define the contours of federal habeas
relief.4
With the Judiciary Act of 1789, the First Congress granted all
federal courts the authority to issue writs of habeas corpus to uncover
percent of the noncapital criminal cases for which discretionary review was sought. See id.
36. See O'Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. at 1734.
37. See idi
38. See 1 JAMES S. LIEBMAN & RANDY HERTZ, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE, § 2.2, at 12-13 (3d ed. 1998). The American writ of habeas
corpus has been governed by statute ever since its inception in 1789. See infra notes 42-92
(describing the development of the habeas statute). Nevertheless, the Court has been
instrumental in defining the limits of habeas relief, see infra notes 97-179 (discussing the
judicial development of exhaustion and procedural default), in filling gaps in the habeas
statute, see, e.g., Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633 (1993) (determining what
harmless-error standard applies on collateral review of certain constitutional errors
despite the statute's failure to address any such standard), and in weighing general
equitable considerations of habeas policy, see McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 489 (1991)
(indicating that the doctrine controlling abuse of the habeas writ emanates from equitable
principles gleaned from legislative history, congressional enactments, and judicial
decisions).
39. In 1807, Chief Justice Marshall wrote that the common law may inform the
meaning of "habeas corpus" but that a statute must confer the power to award the writ.
See Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 93-94 (1807). More recently, Justice Scalia
has indicated that "[w]ithin the very broad limits set by the Suspension Clause, the federal
writ of habeas corpus is governed by statute." Schup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 343 (1995)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). According to Justice Scalia, the Court may
consider equitable considerations only when the statute is silent or ambiguous, lest it
violate the Supremacy Clause. See iL at 350 (Scalia, J., dissenting); cf. Lonchar v. Thomas,
517 U.S. 314, 322-23 (1996) (indicating that Congress is responsible for balancing habeas
policy and that the courts may appeal to equitable concerns only when the statute is not
dispositive); Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 369 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
prerogative writ of habeas corpus should be exercised in accord with an express legislative
command.").
40. See infra notes 97-179 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 42-92 and accompanying text.
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the cause of a prisoner's confinement. 42 The Judiciary Act, however,
prescribed strict jurisdictional limits because the writ of habeas
corpus did not extend to prisoners confined pursuant to state law.
Instead, at its inception, the writ was exclusively a federal remedy for
federal imprisonment. 3
The statute's inapplicability to state prisoners proved
problematic in that state officials avoided the enforcement of
unpopular federal laws by arresting federal officers. 4  Because
federal habeas relief was not available to state prisoners, the federal
courts were unable to intervene, and the imprisoned officials had to
await traditional remedies.45 In effect, the lack of authority to
intervene appeared to welcome state nullification of federal law.46
Consequently, in 1833, Congress expanded the writ to include
individuals confined in state prisons for any act or omission
committed pursuant to a federal law.47 Supporters hoped that the
amendment would ensure that federal law would be uniformly
respected, rather than selectively enforced at the whim of the states.
48
In 1842, Congress again extended the writ, this time to foreign
citizens or subjects imprisoned under federal or state law.49 Congress
42. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82.
43. See id. (stating that writs of habeas corpus shall not extend to prisoners "unless
they are in custody, under or by colour of the authority of the United States").
44. See Steven L. Winter, The Meaning of "Under Color of" Law, 91 MIcH. L. REV.
323, 352 (1992).
45. See James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?: The Anachronistic Attack on
Habeas Corpus/Direct Review Parity, 92 COLuM. L. REV. 1997,2062 (1992).
46. See LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 38, § 2.4(d), at 46.
47. See Act of Mar. 2, 1833, ch. 57, § 7, 4 Stat. 632, 634-35. Congress passed the
amendment spcifically in response to South Carolina's nullification of the tariff of 1832.
See Winter, supra note 44, at 352. Before congressional intervention, the federal
government could not send officers to enforce the tariff for fear that they would be
imprisoned under South Carolina law. See WILLIAM F. DUKER, CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 187 (1980).
The 1833 habeas provisions also allowed federal judges to defeat the states' efforts
to nullify the Fugitive Slave Act, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462 (1850). See, e.g., Exparte Sifford, 22 F.
Cas. 105, 106-07 (S.D. Ohio 1857) (describing a state's arrest of a federal official who was
trying to enforce the Act); Exparte Robinson, 20 F. Cas. 965, 965-66 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1856)
(involving a state court that had held a federal marshal in contempt of court to prevent the
enforcement of the Act). Given the writ's dubious history, Professor Arkin cautions
against arguments that habeas corpus was intended to guarantee the vindication of federal
rights in a federal forum. See Marc M. Arkin, The Ghost at the Banquet: Slavery,
Federalism, and Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1, 72 (1995).
48. Congress was responding to a letter from President Jackson urging it to pass a law
that would prevent state nullification of federal law. See 2 JAMES D. RICHARDSON, A
COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, 610-32
(Washington, Government Printing Office 1896).
49. See Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 257, 5 Stat. 539 (codified at Rev. Stat. § 763 (1878)),
[Vol. 781610
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anticipated that the United States might compromise its relationship
with foreign nations if the federal government remained powerless to
release foreign subjects held in state prisons." Responding to the
rebellion of the southern states, Congress again exercised power over
the writ in 1863 by authorizing the President to suspend the writ in
any part of the United States if, in his judgment, public safety
required it.5
After the Civil War, Congress massively expanded federal
jurisdiction under the writ. The Judiciary Act of 1867 subjected all
confinements to federal habeas review, whether they be pursuant to
state or federal law. This Reconstruction Era extension of the writ
to state imprisonments was a significant departure from the Judiciary
Act of 1789, which explicitly had insulated the states from the
purview of the writ.53 Representative William Lawrence, a member
of the Judiciary Committee, remarked that the Reconstruction bill
would grant to the federal courts the maximum jurisdiction permitted
by the Constitution, ensuring that the wives and children of Union
soldiers, as well as all other persons, could not be confined
unconstitutionally in state prisons. 5 According to Lawrence, "[i]t is a
current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(4) (1994).
50. See DUKER, supra note 47, at 188-89. The Act passed despite a vocal minority
that feared the law would have a deleterious effect on state sovereignty. See CONG.
GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess., app. 1841-42 (1842).
51. See Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 81, § 1, 12 Stat. 755, 755. See DUKER, supra note 47,
at 141-49, for a discussion on the separation-of-powers problem with the executive
suspension of the writ.
52. See Judiciary Act of 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385; Gary Peller, In Defense of Federal
Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 579, 618-19 (1982). But see
Bator, supra note 7, at 474-77 (interpreting the statute historically to mandate review only
when the state court allegedly lacked jurisdiction). Professor Duker argues that the
legislative history is of little help, but that the statute itself is unambiguous-all state
prisoners are covered. See DUKER, supra note 47, at 189-94.
53. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
54. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 4151 (1866) (statement of Rep.
Trumbull); see also Ex parte McCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318, 325-26 (1867) ("It is
impossible to widen this jurisdiction.").
55. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 4151 (1866) (statement of Rep.
Lawrence). The legislation, then, was designed to encourage state compliance with the
Reconstruction effort. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 415 (1963) (stating that the broad
imperative language of the Act, viewed in light of Congress's post-Civil War effort to
supervise the southern states, supports the conclusion that Congress was expanding and
making more effective the habeas statute), overruled in part by Wainwright v. Sykes, 433
U.S. 72 (1977); Ex parte Parks, 93 U.S. 18, 22 (1876) (stating that the Act of 1867 was
"passed in consequence of the state of things that followed the late rebellion"); William J.
Brennan, Federal Habeas Corpus and State Prisoners: An Exercise in Federalism, 7 UTAH
L. REv. 423, 426 (1961) ("In 1867, Congress was anticipating Southern resistance to
Reconstruction and to the implementation of the post-war constitutional amendments.
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bill of the largest liberty, and does not ... restrain the writ of habeas
corpus at all."
56
In describing to the Senate the necessity of extending the writ to
the states, Senator Lyman Trumbull stressed the importance of
allowing federal claims to be litigated in a federal forum.57 According
to Senator Trumbull, when a person is held in a state prison in
violation of the Constitution, he "ought to have in such a case the
benefit of the writ, and we agree that he ought to have recourse to
United State's courts to show that he was illegally imprisoned in
violation of the Constitution. 5 8  When Senator Edgar Cowan
expressed concern about the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over state
supreme court decisions regarding federal law, Senator Trumbull
argued that the Supreme Court should be the final arbiter of federal
law.59 Senator Trumbull's statements support the notion that the
importance of a federal forum for federal claims textured the
congressional reformulation of the writ in 1867. Thus, the Judiciary
Act of 1867 illustrates Congress's ability and willingness to determine
the jurisdictional scope, and consequently the availability, of the writ.
One year later, again in an effort to advance its Reconstruction
agenda, Congress completely stripped the Supreme Court of its
appellate jurisdiction under the Act.60 Congress sought to prevent the
Supreme Court from invalidating the conviction of a prisoner who
publicly criticized the Reconstruction movement.61 Congress did not
The extension.., to state prisoners ... bespoke congressional unwillingness to trust direct
appellate review of state court decisions by the Supreme Court as the lone avenue to
vindication of the new constitutional strictures."). But see Clarke D. Forsythe, The
Historical Origins of Broad Federal Habeas Review Reconsidered, 70 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1079, 1101-17 (1995) (arguing against the notion that the 1867 Act applied to all
state prisoners).
56. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 4151 (1866) (statement of Rep. Lawrence).
57. See id. at 4229 (statement of Sen. Trumbull).
5& 1d. (statement of Sen. Trumbull).
59. See id. (statement of Sen. Trumbull). Professors Liebman and Hertz conclude
that early judicial interpretation of the statute, as well as the immediate statutory context,
support the notion that Congress intended that state prisoners be afforded a federal forum
for the final vindication of federal claims. See LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 38, § 2.4(d),
at 48-49.
60. See Act of March 27, 1868, ch. 34, § 2, 15 Stat. 44 (1868) (partially repealing the
Judiciary Act of 1867) (repealed 1885); Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514-15
(1868) (acknowledging that Congress had deprived the Supreme Court of appellate
jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases). Congress has the constitutional authority to
determine the boundaries of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. See U.S. CONST.
art. IH, § 2, cl. 2.
61. McCardle, a newspaper editor, was arrested pursuant to the Military
Reconstruction Act, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428 (1867). See William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical
Guide to Ex Parte McCardle, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 229, 236 (1973). By stripping the Court of
1612 [Vol. 78
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restore the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over habeas
petitions until 1885.62 The restoration of appellate jurisdiction
represented a compromise between legislators who wanted to
dispense with the writ altogether and those who viewed it as critical to
protecting blacks and other unpopular groups from unfair treatment
by the states.' Restoring appellate jurisdiction preserved the writ
while at the same time providing additional respect for the final
judgments of state courts by making it more difficult for lower federal
courts to trump state decisions.64 Thus, the restoration of Supreme
Court appellate jurisdiction achieved the dual goals of federalism-
respect for state sovereignty and the impartial adjudication of federal
law in a federal forum.65
In 1948, Congress revised the habeas corpus landscape again to
incorporate the judicially developed exhaustion requirement.'
Legislators specifically cited the Supreme Court's holding in Ex parte
Hawk67 as the appropriate rule for exhaustion.' Hawk made clear
that the exhaustion requirement is based on the principle that federal
courts should not interfere with state administration of justice, absent
circumstances of peculiar urgency.69 Consequently, exhaustion is
properly understood as a matter of timing because the doctrine
forbids the federal courts from intervening in an ongoing state
appellate jurisdiction, Congress prevented the invalidation of the Act, which was vital to
the Reconstruction effort itself. See id. at 238-39.
62. See Act of March 3,1885, ch. 353,23 Stat. 437 (1885) (repealed).
63. Many thought it unsavory that lower federal courts could set aside state court
judgments. See, e.g., H.R. REp. No. 48-730, at 4 (1884). Others maintained that the writ
was necessary to ensure that the states treated individuals fairly, the same fear that
inspired the habeas legislation of 1867. See, e.g., id. at 3,5-6.
64. See id. at 6 (recommending that right of appeal to the Supreme Court be
restored).
65. Proponents of the writ argued that local courts could not be trusted with the
impartial adjudication of federal claims. See id at 3, 5-6; see also infra notes 248-52
discussing the inability of the state courts to resolve constitutional claims dispassionately).
66. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 2254, 62 Stat. 869, 967 (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)-(c) (1994 & Supp. III 1997)). The 1948 modification codified the
exhaustion principle, which was first enunciated in Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 251-53
(1886). The statute provides that the writ shall not be granted unless the petitioner has
exhausted his state remedies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (Supp. III 1997).
67. 321 U.S. 114 (1944).
68. See H.R. REP. No. 80-308, at A180 (1947); see also Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509,
516 n.8 (1982) (discussing the legislative history of the codified exhaustion requirement).
69. See Hawk, 321 U.S. at 117. In Ex parte Royall, the Court's first exhaustion case,
the Court indicated that the timing of federal review is at the discretion of the federal
judge. See Royall, 117 U.S. at 251. Because of the demands of the federal system,
however, the Court suggested that the federal courts refrain from adjudicating federal
claims until prisoners have exhausted their state remedies. See id.
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proceeding, but does not in any way preclude federal courts from
hearing claims after such proceedings have ended.0  Congress
expressly allowed federal courts to hear habeas petitions if there was
"either an absence of available State corrective process or the
existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to
protect the rights of the prisoner."'71 By codifying Hawk, Congress
intended that the federal courts, absent the availability of ineffective
state remedies or other extraordinary circumstances, elect to defer
their adjudication of federal claims until defendants have exhausted
state remedies. Contrary to the decision in O'Sullivan, Congress did
not intend for exhaustion to collapse into the doctrine of procedural
default.72
70. See Hawk, 116 U.S. at 116-17; Royall, 117 U.S. at 251. The majority in O'Sullivan,
on the other hand, has incorrectly construed the exhaustion requirement as preclusive.
Under O'Sullivan, if a state prisoner did not exhaust her state remedies when she had the
chance, then the issues have been defaulted for the purpose of federal habeas review. See
O'Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. at 1736. Put differently, Justice O'Connor equates exhaustion with
procedural default. See infra notes 139-79 for a discussion of the doctrine of procedural
default. The judiciary developed the procedural default requirement in order to give
effect to the comity interests of the statutory exhaustion requirement. See Ex parte
Spencer, 228 U.S. 652, 660-61 (1912). Without the procedural default requirement, a
prisoner simply could bypass the state courts by letting time lapse on state remedies. See
O'Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. at 1737 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
71. Act of June 25, 1998, ch. 646, § 2254, 62 Stat. at 967 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254).
The first statutory exception distinguishes exhaustion from the related concept of
procedural default. If, at the time of filing, there are no available state remedies, for
whatever reason, then the petition may not be dismissed for nonexhaustion. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(b)(1)(B)(i) (Supp. III 1997); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732 (1991)
(indicating that a prisoner who has procedurally defaulted in state court meets the
exhaustion requirement). Whether the petition will be barred on a procedural default
theory is a separate question not governed by the statute, but, rather, by case law. See
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90-91 (1977) (holding that procedural defaults in state
court will only be excused if they pass the "cause and prejudice" test). To determine
whether the petitioner's claim has been defaulted, the court will assess whether the
petitioner had cause for failing to raise the claim in the state court and whether the
petitioner would suffer actual prejudice therefrom. See id.
Hawk itself indicated that there are cases of peculiar urgency that might warrant
federal interruption of state proceedings. See Hawk, 321 U.S. at 117. For examples of
instances of peculiar urgency, see Urquhart v. Brown, 205 U.S. 179, 182 (1907) (explaining
that cases "involving the authority and operations of the general government, or the
obligations of this country to, or its relations with, foreign nations" are particularly
urgent); In re Lincoln, 202 U.S. 178, 183 (1906) (explaining that intervention may have
been appropriate on an issue of great significance when the state and local federal courts
disagreed on the point of law and the state court of appeals had already decided the
question adversely to the petitioner, so that a writ of error from that court would have
accomplished nothing); Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 251-52 (1886) (explaining that
intervention may be appropriate when the state prisoner is being held for an act or
omission committed pursuant to federal law, when a foreign subject or citizen is being held
in state custody, or when a witness needed to testify in federal court is in state custody).
72. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B)(i); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732.
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In 1966, Congress again amended the federal habeas corpus
statute, this time responding to the steadily increasing number of
petitions.7 3 Congress recognized that the adjudication of frivolous
habeas claims had become a severe burden on the federal courts.74
The amendments sought to ease the burden on federal courts by
controlling potential abuses of the writ, namely state prisoners
submitting repetitious habeas petitions.7 5 The amendments preclude
state prisoners from seeking habeas relief on federal issues that
previously have been adjudicated by the Supreme Court on
certiorari.76 Such claims are deemed res judicata so long as there are
no new legal or factual developments that were previously
unavailable to the Court.77 Congress also gave district courts the
discretionary power to deny petitions that have already been heard
and adjudicated by another federal court78 so long as no new factual
or other grounds for relief are presented.79 Lastly, Congress sought to
relieve the burden on the federal courts by making state findings of
fact dispositive, unless the petitioner falls within a statutory
exception. 0
73. See Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 98-711, § 1, 80 Stat. at 1104 (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 2244(b) (1994), S. REP. No. 89-1797 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3663,
3663-64.
74. See id. at 3664.
75. See id. at 3667.
76. See Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 98-711, § 1, 80 Stat. at 1104 (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 2244(c) (1994)).
77. See id. The court also must be satisfied that reasonable diligence would not have
made such material available to the Supreme Court. See id.
78. See Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-711, 80 Stat. 1104 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(b) (1994)). This amendment to the statute codified the successive petition rule in
Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224,231-32 (1924).
79. See Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-711, § 1, 80 Stat. at 1104 (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 2244(b) (1994), amended by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (Supp. III 1997)). If there are
new grounds for review, the court must be satisfied that the petitioner did not withhold
those grounds from the prior court. See id.
80. See id. at 1105 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994), amended by 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(e) (Supp. 1 1997)). State court findings of fact are not dispositive if: (1) the
factual dispute was not resolved on the merits at the state level; (2) the state had an
inadequate fact finding procedure; (3) the material facts were not adequately developed;
(4) the state court lacked jurisdiction; (5) the state court failed to appoint counsel for an
indigent defendant; (6) the defendant did not receive a fair hearing; (7) the defendant was
denied due process; or (8) the state factual determination was not supported by the record.
See i. at 1105. This statute codified the historic preference for deference to state court
findings of fact, see Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 335-36 (1915) (holding that the
court's "determination of the facts ... must be taken as setting forth the truth of the
matter"), and trumped recent Supreme Court decisions limiting this preference, see
Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1963); see also Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 422
(1963) ("[T]he Federal District Court has a broad power on habeas to hold an evidentiary
hearing and determine the facts."), overruled in part by Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72
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Despite the 1966 amendments, the great number of federal
habeas petitions and the perceived abuse of the writ continued,
prompting Congress to pass the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA or "the Act").8 1 While a detailed
discussion of the Act's substance is beyond the scope of this Note, the
AEDPA is significant because it embodies a congressional initiative
"to curb the abuse of the statutory writ of habeas corpus, and to
address the acute problems of unnecessary delay and abuse in capital
cases. ''  In addition to providing a statute of limitations and
modifying the rules governing successive petitions, the AEDPA also
grants federal courts discretion to dismiss on the merits any petition
containing a meritorious unexhausted claim, in addition to other
exhausted claims-rather than requiring dismissal simply for
nonexhaustion.8Y The AEDPA further dictates that, when a state fails
to raise a nonexhaustion defense, the courts should not consider the
defense waived absent an express waiver.84
(1977); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 313-16 (1963) (explaining that if the state court's
fact-finding procedures were inadequate "it is the federal judge's duty to disregard the
state findings and take evidence anew"). Notably, the 1966 amendments were drafted in
response to an anticipated proposal that would have required federal deference to state
court determinations of mixed questions of law and fact. See H.R. REP. No. 88-1384, at 1-
3, 6, 22-23 (1964) (Su. Doc. No. Y1.1/8:88-1384). The drafting committee thought this
proposal to be "wholly incompatible with the duty of Federal courts to determine Federal
constitutional questions." Id at 23.
81. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2244-2266 (Supp. M 1997)).
82. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-518, at 111 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924,
944.
83. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (Supp. 1 1997). Before the passage of the AEDPA,
Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982), governed mixed petitions containing both
exhausted and unexhausted claims. Under Rose, such a petition had to be dismissed for
nonexhaustion, leaving the petitioner either to exhaust the unexhausted claims or file a
new habeas petition containing only the exhausted claims. Id at 520. The AEDPA
supersedes Rose, allowing federal judges to dismiss mixed petitions on the merits,
precluding any opportunity to exhaust unexhausted claims in state court or to file a new
federal habeas petition containing only the exhausted claims. See, e.g., Loving v. O'Keefe,
960 F. Supp. 46, 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (indicating that the statute supersedes Rose); Duarte
v. Hershberger, 947 F. Supp. 146, 149-50 (D.N.J. 1996) (same).
84. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3). In Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 130 (1987), the
Court considered whether states should be able to raise a nonexhaustion defense for the
first time at the appellate level. Rather than enunciating either a per se rule that would
deem the defense waived or a rule that would require dismissal for nonexhaustion, the
Court advocated a case-by-case approach, allowing federal courts to choose between
dismissing for nonexhaustion or deciding the issue on the merits, whichever further
advanced interests of comity and federalism. See id at 133-34. Consequently, the
AEDPA superseded the rule announced in Granberry. See, e.g., Demarest v. Price, 130
F.3d 922, 933-34 (10th Cir. 1997) (indicating that the statute allows the finding of a waiver
on the part of the state only in those cases in which the state expressly waives the defense,
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Notably, the AEDPA limits the authority of the federal courts to
adjudicate matters of federal law that already have been decided by
the states.' Significant disagreement exists, however, as to the degree
of the limitation. Some commentators see the provision as
articulating two standards of review-the "contrary to" standard,
which applies to pure legal claims, and the "unreasonable
application" standard, which applies to mixed questions of law and
fact.86 The "contrary to" standard is nondeferential, giving the
federal court authority to review legal claims de novo whenever the
state court is incorrect." The "unreasonable application" standard
establishes a strong presumption in favor of state court decisions88
and requires federal courts to defer to reasonable state judgments
relating to mixed questions, even when those state decisions are
contrary to established federal law.89 Professors Liebman and Ryan
argue persuasively, however, that Congress did not intend to create
such a radical limitation on federal power.9° Rather, they argue that a
state court may be reversed if a federal court determines that the
state court violated existing Supreme Court precedent or, in the
absence of precedent, created a rule that was an unreasonable
thus removing the discretion under Granberry to infer waiver from silence); Gaylor v.
Harrelson, 962 F. Supp. 1498,1499 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (same).
85. The federal court cannot rule on a state violation of federal law unless the
violation was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." AEDPA, Pub.
L. No. 104-132, § 104(3)(1), 110 Stat. at 1219 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1) (Supp. III 1997)).
86. See Evan Tsen Lee, Section 2254(d) of the New Habeas Statute: An (Opinionated)
User's Manual, 51 VAND. L. REV. 103, 110-11 (1998); Sharad Sushil Khandelwal, Note,
The Path to Habeas Corpus Narrows: Interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1), 96 MICH. L.
REV. 434,445-52 (1997).
87. See Khandelwal, supra note 86, at 453.
88. See Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 870 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc) ("Section
2254(d)(1) ... tells federal courts: Hands off, unless the judgment in place is based on an
error grave enough to be called 'unreasonable.' "), rev'd, 521 U.S. 320 (1997); Khandelwal,
supra note 86, at 455-56 (concluding that the statute requires deference only if the state
court's action was "unreasonable rather than merely incorrect"). But see Lee, supra note
86, at 117 ("If the mistake is one that would not ordinarily be made by a judge exercising
due diligence, then it is unreasonable.").
89. See James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, "Some Effectual Power". The Quantity
and Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 696,
868-69 (1998). President Clinton, upon signing the AEDPA, wrote that any interpretation
limiting the judiciary's independent judgment of federal law would be unconstitutional
under Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). See Statement by President
William J. Clinton upon Signing S. 735,32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 719,721 (Apr. 26,
1996).
90. See Liebman & Ryan, supra note 89, at 870-72.
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application of noncontrolling Supreme Court decisions.9" Whatever
the correct interpretation of the scope of federal court power may be,
the AEDPA clearly was designed to foster greater respect for state
adjudication of federal law and a concomitant restriction of federal
authority. 2
As this history shows, from its inception in 1789 until the late
twentieth century, the writ of habeas corpus has been a statutory
remedy. Far from remaining impotent to formulate and revise habeas
policy, Congress has demonstrated its willingness and ability to
respond to various crises, sometimes extending the writ's scope, while
at other times restricting it. The writ, however, has not been under
the exclusive control of Congress. 3 The judiciary also has been
instrumental in forging the identity of the writ, most significantly by
formulating and refining the doctrines of exhaustion 94 and procedural
default. 95 Historically, exhaustion and procedural default have been
91. See id. at 866-67. This statute codified the rule enunciated in Teague as developed
by its progeny. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 305-06 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(indicating that, because the primary purpose behind habeas corpus review is to encourage
states to respect constitutional standards, the court need not apply new rules
retroactively); Zuern v. Tate, 938 F. Supp. 468, 475-76 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (indicating that
the statute is a codification and modification of Teague and its progeny). Cases
subsequent to Teague have clarified that state decisions will be upheld if they are
reasonable applications of existing Supreme Court precedents. See Gilmore v. Taylor, 508
U.S. 333, 351 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (suggesting that state
decisions should not be overturned on habeas review if the state court "makes a
'reasonable, good-faith interpretation[']' of our precedents as they exist at the time of
decision" (quoting Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 414 (1989))); Butler, 494 U.S. at 414
(stating that the Teague principle "validates reasonable, good-faith interpretations of
existing precedents").
92. First, under the statute, only the Supreme Court may clearly establish federal law;
second, law must be clearly established as of the time of the state decision; third, there are
no recognized exceptions in which post-finality law applies; fourth, rather than reviewing
legal claims de novo, the federal court may only review the state decision to determine if it
is consistent with federal law. See LIEBMAN & RYAN, supra note 89, at 867-68.
93. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 81 (1977) (noting that the Supreme Court
has modified the writ's scope even though the statute itself has not changed).
94. Congress codified the judicially developed exhaustion doctrine in 1948. See 28
U.S.C. § 2254(b)-(c) (1994), amended by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (Supp. III 1997); supra note
66 and accompanying text.
95. This Note discusses only the judicial development of exhaustion and procedural
default. There have, of course, been other significant judicial pronouncements of habeas
policy, including the Court's rule that Fourth Amendment claims may not be heard on
habeas if the state court afforded the defendant a full and fair opportunity for litigation,
see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976), the Court's holding that a bare innocence
claim absent any independent constitutional violation does not constitute a ground for
federal habeas relief, see Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993), and the Court's
ruling that it will not apply new constitutional rules in habeas proceedings retroactively,
see Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288,310 (1989).
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distinct, though related, concepts developed by two separate lines of
cases?
6
The Court first formulated the doctrine of exhaustion in Ex parte
Royally7 The decision focused on the authority of federal courts, by
the writ of habeas corpus, to free state prisoners before their trials in
state court.98 First, the Court considered whether federal courts have
the jurisdiction to discharge state prisoners from custody.9  After
concluding that Congress had clearly granted such jurisdiction to the
federal courts,1' the Court next considered whether Congress
required that the federal courts exercise that jurisdiction.101 The
Court held that the federal courts' broad jurisdictional authority does
not necessitate that they hear federal claims before states have had an
opportunity to adjudicate those claims."°  Instead, the Court
concluded that the demands of the federal system, in which
concurrent jurisdiction is vested with the power to adjudicate federal
law, require federal courts to elect to hear federal claims only after a
state has had an opportunity to hear the claims.0 3 Additionally,
federalism requires that intervention in state proceedings be reserved
only for situations of great urgency.1°4
96. See O'Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. at 1735-37 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
97. 117 U.S. 241 (1886).
98. See id. at 251-53.
99. See id. at 245.
100. See id. at 249-50.
101. See id at 251.
102. See id. Because the exhaustion requirement was concerned with the interruption
of state process, it merely delayed, but did not preclude, federal review. According to
Justice Brennan, "the decision clearly contemplated that the state prisoner was free to
return to the federal court for relief if the state courts would not hear him or decided the
federal claims against him." Brennan, supra note 55, at 428.
103. See Royall, 117 U.S. at 251. The Court repeatedly has affirmed that the interests
of comity and federalism animate the exhaustion doctrine. See Granberry v. Greer, 481
U.S. 129, 133-34 (1987); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982); Duckworth v. Serrano,
454 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1981) (per curiam); Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S.
484, 490-91 (1973); Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950), overruled in part by Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), overruled in part by Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
104. The Court remarked that, in cases of peculiar urgency, the federal court may
discharge from state custody a prisoner who has not exhausted state remedies. See Royall,
117 U.S. at 251-52. The court may exercise its discretion, for example, when: (1) the state
prisoner is being held for an act or omission committed pursuant to federal law, see iL; (2)
when a subject or citizen of a foreign state is being held in state custody, see id.; (3) when a
witness needed to testify in federal court is in state custody, see id; (4) when the case
involves the "authority and operations of the general government," Urquhart v. Brown,
205 U.S. 179, 182 (1907); or (5) when the issue is of great importance and the state and
federal courts disagree and the state court of appeals has already ruled against the
petitioner, see In re Lincoln, 202 U.S. 178, 183 (1906). The Court has created other
nonstatutory exceptions, but has indicated that such exceptions are to be left largely to the
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In Urquhart v. Brown, the Court applied the exhaustion
principle to the federal writ of error remedy in the Supreme Court.
In Urquhart, the petitioner was acquitted of murder by reason of
insanity at his state trial, but was committed to prison because he was
judged to be a danger to society.10 6 The petitioner appealed to the
state supreme court and was denied relief.lc° At the time of Urquhart,
the Supreme Court did not yet have a discretionary docket; state
prisoners had a right to obtain Supreme Court writ of error review of
state supreme court decisions.'08 Rather than petition for a writ of
error, however, the petitioner in Urquhart sought a writ of habeas
corpus in the lower federal court. °9 The court granted the writ and
discharged the prisoner from custody."0 On appeal, the Supreme
Court reversed the lower federal court, indicating that the federal
court should not discharge the petitioner from custody because such a
discharge would interrupt the normal course of review of state
supreme court decisions."' The Court explained that, absent
extraordinary circumstances, lower federal courts should leave a state
prisoner to his state remedies and to Supreme Court writ of error
review of those remedies because it is unseemly for a single federal
judge to interject her lone authority into the appellate process to
discretion of the district courts. See, e.g., Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 521 (1952)
(indicating that whether special circumstances warranting federal interruption of state
process exist must be determined on a case-by-case basis at the discretion of the district
court); Darr, 339 U.S. at 210 (indicating that other exceptions to the exhaustion
requirement may develop). But see Duckworth, 454 U.S. at 4-5 (holding that the existence
of a clear constitutional violation does not qualify as an exception to the exhaustion
requirement and criticizing the Court's previous willingness to recognize nonstatutory
exceptions).
The habeas statute itself recognizes two exceptions to the exhaustion requirement.
A federal court may consider a claim, notwithstanding the failure to exhaust, if "there is
an absence of available State corrective process" or if "circumstances exist that render
such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B)
(Supp. 111997); see also supra note 71 (explaining that the first of the statutory exceptions
entails that a state procedural default ipso facto meets the exhaustion requirement).
105. See Urquhart v. Brown, 205 U.S. 179,181-82 (1907); see also Darr, 339 U.S. at 206;
In re Wood, 140 U.S. 278,287 (1891).
106. See Urquhart, 205 U.S. at 179.
107. See id. at 180.
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See id The circuit court ruled that committing the petitioner to prison without an
opportunity to defend himself or to produce evidence in his defense violated the
Fourteenth Amendment. See id at 180-81.
111. See id at 181, 183; see also Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 436 (1963) (remarking that
before the discretionary docket, Supreme Court writ of error review was a stage of the
normal appellate process), overruled in part by Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1997).
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discharge a prisoner."
Ex parte Hawk"' is the classic and still controlling formulation of
the exhaustion requirement. Hawk affirmed that state remedies, as
well as federal writ of error and certiorari remedies, must be
exhausted before a federal court may grant habeas relief."4 More
importantly, Hawk underscored the notion that the exhaustion
requirement is a matter of timing, explaining that the federal courts
should not act so long as there is an available and adequate state
remedy."' But, in cases in which no state remedy exists or the
remedy is otherwise unavailable or inadequate, federal courts may
adjudicate the federal claims."6
The history of the exhaustion requirement illustrates that it was
never intended to preclude federal review of federal claims.17 Before
the advent of the discretionary Supreme Court docket, the exhaustion
requirement left the prisoner to his federal writ of error and certiorari
remedies, ensuring that a single federal judge would not have
unbridled discretion to upset state criminal process."" It should be
noted that the federal writ of error remedy nevertheless ensured that
112. See Urquhart, 205 U.S. at 182-83; see also Markuson v. Boucher, 175 U.S. 184, 187
(1899) (discussing the "delicate" nature of federal jurisdiction that would allow a single
judge to reverse the judgment of a state supreme court when the writ of error remedy is
available in the Supreme Court); Baker v. Grice, 169 U.S. 284, 290-91 (1898) (discussing
the exhaustion principle-both as to state remedies and the Supreme Court writ of error
remedy-and remarking that the reason for the rule is to prevent a single federal judge
from discharging a state prisoner).
113. 321 U.S. 114 (1944).
114. See id. at 116-17. The Fay Court criticized the rule in Hawk that defendants must
apply for certiorari as a precondition to federal habeas relief. See Fay, 372 U.S. at 435-38.
In any event, because the Supreme Court rarely grants certiorari, federal habeas corpus
has become the primary vehicle for the federal adjudication of federal rights. Between
1995 and 1997, the Supreme Court has issued signed and per curiam opinions in under 100
certiorari petitions per term. See Kevin H. Smith, Justice for All?: The Supreme Court's
Denial of Pro Se Petitions for Certiorari, 63 ALB. L. REV. 381, 425 n.6 (1999). Because the
Supreme Court considers so few cases, the vast majority of federal adjudication takes
place on habeas review.
115. See Hawk, 321 U.S. at 116-17. Congress codified Hawk's exhaustion principles in
its 1948 amendment to the habeas statute. See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
116. See Hawk, 321 U.S. at 118.
117. The habeas statute that codified the judicially developed exhaustion requirement
clearly indicates that failure to exhaust does not in and of itself preclude federal habeas
review. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (indicating that, if for any reason state
remedies are unavailable, the petition may not be dismissed for nonexhaustion). The
judicial history of the exhaustion requirement likewise indicates that the requirement was
meant to prevent only federal interruption of state proceedings. So long as the federal
courts are not interrupting available state processes, the federal courts may entertain
federal claims. As such, the exhaustion requirement is a matter of timing, not preclusion.
See supra notes 97-116 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 105-12 and accompanying text.
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state prisoners would secure a federal forum in which to litigate
constitutional claims. With the advent of the discretionary docket,
the exhaustion requirement simply delayed federal habeas relief until
state remedies were no longer available." 9 In so doing, federal
habeas review became the primary means for the federal government
to safeguard federal rights.120 Both before and after the advent of the
discretionary docket, the exhaustion requirement was never intended
to preclude the meaningful federal review of federal claims.
Despite statutory language that suggests a mechanical
application of the exhaustion requirement, the Court in Ex parte
Royall indicated that the exhaustion requirement is discretionary."2
More recently, Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky"
and Granberry v. Greet24 held that inasmuch as principles of comity
and federalism animate the exhaustion requirement, a strict,
relentless application of the requirement is unwarranted.'2 In
119. See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 114 (indicating that, even though there is some indication that
defendants must apply for certiorari as a prerequisite to habeas review, the fact that
certiorari is rarely granted has institutionalized habeas review as the primary means to
adjudicate federal rights in a federal forum).
121. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (Supp. III 1997) ("An application for a writ of
habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court
shall not be granted unless it appears that (A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies
available in the courts of the State."(emphasis added)).
122. 117 U.S. 241, 251 (1886).
123. 410 U.S. 484 (1973).
124. 481 U.S. 129 (1987).
125. See Granberry, 481 U.S. at 131; Braden, 410 U.S. at 489-90; see also Larry W.
Yackle, The Exhaustion Doctrine in Federal Habeas Corpus: An Argument for a Return to
First Principles, 44 OHIo ST. LJ. 393, 394 (1983) ("[T]he federal courts' discretion in
exhaustion cases is gradually being replaced by a set of rigid rules that fails to serve the
doctrine's rationales and, indeed, threatens to create greater friction between the federal
and state courts."); Norlynn Blocker, Comment, An Exercise in Comity, 35 BAYLOR L.
REv. 497, 508 (1983) (indicating that a strict application of the exhaustion requirement
often frustrates the interests of comity). The Court sometimes has advocated a
mechanical application of the exhaustion requirement when such a broad rule ostensibly
would advance federalism and comity interests. See, e.g., Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509,522
(1982) (requiring dismissal of all federal habeas petitions that contain both exhausted and
unexhausted claims because dismissal promotes comity); Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S.
1, 4 (1981) (per curiam) (requiring that clear constitutional violations be exhausted in part
because of federal-state comity considerations). Occasionally, the Court has advocated a
harsh application of the exhaustion rule when such application would not promote comity
interests. See, e.g., Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6-7 (1982) (per curiam) (holding that
the exhaustion requirement was not satisfied because the state prisoner had not
federalized his constitutional claim properly for the state court). Because the state court
will almost certainly decide the federalized issue as it had previously, see id. at 11-12
(Stevens, J., dissenting), the Court's adherence to the exhaustion rule in reality burdens
the state court. For a similar criticism of the dismissal requirement for mixed petitions,
see Rose, 455 U.S. at 525 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
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Braden, the prisoner brought an action in federal court alleging that
his constitutional right to a speedy trial had been violated. 126  The
prisoner had not yet been tried; consequently, the state had not yet
adjudicated the federal claim. 27 Thus, the key issue for the Court was
whether the exhaustion doctrine prevented the federal court from
hearing the prisoner's constitutional claim. The Court held that the
exhaustion requirement "cannot be used as a blunderbuss to shatter
the attempt at litigation of constitutional claims without regard to the
purposes that underlie the doctrine and that called it into
existence."'2 In this instance, the Court indicated that the interests of
comity and federalism had been satisfied. 29 According to the Court,
the prisoner presented the state with an opportunity to adjudicate his
federal claim, but the state refused to try him;3' the prisoner did not
enter federal court to bypass the state proceeding, but rather to force
the state court to adjudicate his claim.'' As a result, the Court held it
proper for the federal court to hear the prisoner's federal claim. Not
surprisingly, Chief Justice Burger, Justice Powell, and then-Justice
Rehnquist sharply dissented, arguing that the majority's holding
represented a relaxation of the exhaustion requirement in the
absence of truly extraordinary circumstances and, consequently, was
an improper interference with the state's administration of justice.132
The Court affirmed the Braden notion of a flexible exhaustion
requirement in 1987. In Granberry, the Court considered how the
federal appellate courts should deal with unexhausted claims when
states fail to raise an exhaustion defense in federal district court.
133
Rather than considering the defense waived or insisting on a
mechanical application of the exhaustion rule, the Court instead held
Despite the exhaustion requirement's discretionary underpinnings, it has "become
a rather rigid means to reject federal habeas corpus applications from state prisoners."
AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, TOWARD A MORE JUST AND EFFECriVE SYSTEM OF REVIEW IN
STATE DEATH PENALTY CASES 103 (1990).
126. See Braden, 410 U.S. at 487.
127. See id at 489.
128. I- at 490.
129. See id at 491-92.
130. The prisoner had escaped from custody in Kentucky before trial and was
subsequently apprehended in Alabama, where he was convicted of various offenses.
Kentucky refused to return him for trial on the Kentucky charges for fear of another
escape. See id. at 491.
131. See id.
132. See id at 507-08 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). This dissent is not surprising because
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Powell have been vocal proponents of restricting
access to habeas review. See infra notes 224-31 (describing Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Justice Powell, and Justice O'Connor's efforts to curb access to habeas review).
133. See Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129,131 (1987).
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that principles of comity and federalism, which are the bases of the
exhaustion rule, should guide the lower courts." If, for example, the
federal claim hinges on an unresolved fact or issue of state law, it is
efficient and faithful to the ideal of federalism to require that the
claim be exhausted in the state forum. 35 If, however, the prisoner
raises an obviously meritless federal claim, it neither serves any
interest of federalism nor increases or promotes efficiency to insist
that the state first adjudicate the claim; rather, it is appropriate that
the federal court dispense with the claim and adjudicate it on its
merits.3 6 Thus, Granberry urges against a mechanical application of
the exhaustion requirement, instead adopting a case-by-case analysis
of whether the underlying principles of the exhaustion requirement
would be served by its application. 37
The case law on exhaustion, then, reveals a doctrine of deference
on the part of the federal district courts intended to serve federalism
and comity interests. By deferring to state proceedings, the federal
courts give the state courts the first chance to enforce federal law.
The exhaustion requirement also prevents a single federal judge from
interfering with the normal course of review of state criminal
judgments.3 8 This deferral requirement is not, however, intended to
preclude federal review of constitutional issues. Moreover, if the
principles of federalism that underlie the requirement are not
advanced, then the rule need not be applied at all.
The exhaustion requirement's companion doctrine-the
procedural default requirement-is critical if the exhaustion
requirement is to have any effect.139 The judiciary originated the
procedural default doctrine as early as 1913 in Ex parte Spencer 40 in
order to give effect to the exhaustion requirement. In Spencer, the
prisoners filed a federal habeas petition alleging that they were
imprisoned unjustly pursuant to an ex post facto state law. 14' The
Court held that the petitioners had had ample opportunity to object
to the validity of their sentences at their initial sentencing, on appeal
134. See id. at 134.
135. See id at 134-35.
136. See id at 135.
137. See id at 134-35.
138. See supra notes 112.
139. As one Court explained, the exhaustion rule "would be useless except to enforce a
temporary delay ... if it gave freedom to omit such defenses in the state court... and yet
the accused have an absolute right to habeas corpus." Exparte Spencer, 228 U.S. 652, 660
(1913).
140. 228 U.S. 652 (1913).
141. See id. at 660.
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to the superior court, and when they applied to the supreme court. 42
According to the Court, raising the federal claim at the state
proceeding is both efficient and orderly-orderly because such
objections should be raised in state criminal proceedings, and efficient
because the state courts can correct such violations without burdening
the federal courts.143 More importantly, omitting defenses in state
courts undermines a state's criminal justice system by making state
judgments "unstable and uncertain."' 4 Explaining this effect on state
criminal proceedings, the Court concluded "[i]f defenses may be
omitted at trials, rights of review omitted, and yet availed of through
habeas corpus, the whole course of criminal justice will be deranged
and, it may be, defeated." 4
While Spencer explained the costs of litigating defaulted claims
in a federal forum, Brown v. Allen'" enunciated the value of federal
review of constitutional claims.147 In Brown, the Court considered
three cases, each involving state prisoners that had been sentenced to
death, each appealing for federal habeas relief after the state supreme
court either affirmed or refused to review the conviction. 4 The
Court held that state court adjudications of federal law are properly
the subjects of federal habeas review." By holding that state
adjudications of constitutional issues are not res judicata and that
they "carr[y] the weight that federal practice gives to the conclusion
of a court of last resort of another jurisdiction on federal
142. See id- at 659.
143. See id.
144. IM. at 660--61.
145. Id. at 661.
146. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
147. The competing aims of Spencer and Brown strike at the heart of the Court's
vacillation on the issue of procedural default. See infra notes 152-74 and accompanying
text (discussing the various philosophies of procedural default espoused by the Court). A
relaxed rule results in disrespect for state criminal processes and procedural rules. See
Spencer, 228 U.S. at 661. Too harsh of a procedural default rule, however, will result in
the dismissal of many potentially meritorious claims that can be adjudicated adequately
only in federal courts. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 424 (1963) (discussing the "manifest
federal policy that federal constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied
without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial review"), overruled in part by
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1997); Brown, 344 U.S. at 458 (holding that state court
adjudications of constitutional issues are not res judicata and are, therefore, reviewable by
the federal court).
148. In the first and second cases, the state supreme court affirmed the death sentences
of two African-Americans convicted of rape. See Brown, 344 U.S. at 466-67, 477-78. In
the third case, Daniels, the North Carolina Supreme Court refused to consider an untimely
appeal by two African-Americans convicted of murder. See id at 482-85. The appeal was
one day late. See idt at 484-85.
149. See id. at 458.
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constitutional issues," the Court underscored the importance of
litigating federal claims in a federal forum."' In essence, Brown
established the principle that federal and state courts are not
fungible.1
5 1
In the years since Brown, the Court has advanced several
theories of procedural default. Among the harshest applications of
the procedural default cases was Brown's companion case, Daniels v.
Allen.s2  In that case, a North Carolina court convicted the
petitioners of murder and sentenced them to death.5  The trial judge
granted the petitioners sixty days in which to file a notice of appeal'-
4
Their counsel filed the notice of appeal one day late, and the state
court of appeals refused to hear the tardy appeal,155 which in turn
precluded the North Carolina Supreme Court from reviewing the
case. 6 Discussing the exhaustion requirement, the United States
Supreme Court said that "[a] failure to use a state's available remedy,
in the absence of some interference or incapacity ... bars federal
habeas corpus. The statute requires that the applicant exhaust
available state remedies. '15 7 In effect, Daniels equated procedural
default with the failure to exhaust state remedies. s8 Relying on this
exhaustion theory, the Court formulated the extraordinarily harsh
procedural default rule that if a prisoner failed in the past to exhaust
state remedies, and the state remedy is no longer available, then the
federal claim is defaulted automatically absent circumstances of
incapacity or interference. 59  Because, according to Daniels, the
150. Id.
151. See id, Professor Bator advanced the theory that Brown expressed for the first
time the unqualified applicability of the writ to all state adjudications of federal law. See
Bator, supra note 7, at 463-64.
152. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
153. See id. at 482.
154. See id. at 484-85.
155. See id. The court did not send the petitioners' counsel any of the court transcript
until thirty days had lapsed. See Brennan, supra note 55, at 430. Almost one-half of the
500-page transcript arrived 10 days before the deadline. See id. The appeal was ready one
day early on a Thursday. See id. If the attorney had mailed the appeal on Friday, the
deadline would have been met. Instead, he hand delivered the appeal on Saturday, getting
the appeal to the court almost certainly earlier than the postal service would have. See id.
Consequently, the appeal was barred. See id.
156. See Brown, 344 U.S. at 485.
157. Id. at 487 (emphasis added). The Court would allow for intervention from the
federal district court if the appeal was not timely due to a lack of counsel, incapacity, or
interference by officials. See id. at 485-86.
15& See Curtis R. Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact of an Abortive State
Proceeding, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1315, 1365-66 (1961). Justice O'Connor advanced the
same theory in O'Sullivan. 119 S. Ct. at 1731.
159. See Brown, 344 U.S. at 486-87. The state supreme court would not review the
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procedural default rule is coterminous with the exhaustion
requirement, the federal court need only ask whether the prisoner
failed to avail himself of some available state remedy. 6 The Court,
however, has since abandoned the Daniels approach, moving two
steps away from Daniels in 1963161 and taking one step back in 1977.162
In 1963, the Court abandoned the exhaustion theory of
procedural default and adopted a waiver theory. Relying on the
traditional notion of waiver,"6' which is "an intentional relinquishment
or abandonment of a known right or privilege," 64 the Court held in
Fay v. Noia that a federal claim may be deemed defaulted if the
prisoner "understandingly and knowingly forewent the privilege of
seeking to vindicate his federal claims in the state courts, whether for
strategic, tactical, or any other reasons that can fairly be described as
the deliberate by-passing of state procedures."'65  The Fay Court
recognized that concerns of federalism and state sovereignty require
that federal courts not hear claims by state prisoners who deliberately
have evaded state procedures. 16 The Court also recognized that,
because federal and state hearings are not mutually exclusive,
withholding a federal claim from a state forum is not in a prisoner's
best interest.67 The Court, however, distinguished deliberate default
petitioner's death sentence in Daniels because his appeal was one day late; the U.S.
Supreme Court affirmed that failure to exhaust state remedies bars federal habeas corpus.
See id at 487.
160. Note that this view of exhaustion as preclusive directly contradicts the exhaustion
case history and statute. Case law indicates that the exhaustion requirement is a matter of
timing, designed to prevent the federal interruption of state process, not a matter of
preclusion. See supra notes 97-120 and accompanying text (discussing the judicial
development of the exhaustion requirement). The codification of the exhaustion
requirement likewise indicates that the exhaustion requirement is intended to defer, not
preclude, federal review of federal claims. See supra note 71 (indicating that the statutory
language allows federal adjudication if there are no available state remedies, for whatever
reason).
161. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439 (1963) (enunciating the deliberate bypass
theory of procedural default), overruled in part by Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72
(1977).
162. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90-91 (1977) (replacing the deliberate
bypass standards with the less forgiving cause and prejudice standard).
163. Fay explicitly disavows the "adequate independent basis" theory of waiver later
endorsed by the Court in Sykes. Fay, 372 U.S. at 429-34; see also Sykes, 433 U.S. at 81-82
(1977) (indicating that the issue presented in the case was whether state court decisions
resting on an adequate and independent foundation of state procedural law should be
insulated from federal review); infra notes 169-79 (discussing Sykes).
164. Fay, 372 U.S. at 439 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)
(emphasis added)).
165. Id.
166. See id. at 433.
167. See id.; see also Sykes, 433 U.S. at 102-04 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
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from accidental default by explaining that with accidental default, the
strong federal interest in remedying unconstitutional state
imprisonments outweighs whatever residual state interest may exist in
barring federal review." Thus, the Court held that failure to exhaust
state remedies does not bar federal review so long as the prisoner did
not deliberately bypass the state court.
In 1977, Wainwright v. Sykes abandoned the "deliberate bypass"
standard of Fay, replacing it with the less forgiving "cause and
prejudice" standard. 69 Sykes held that federal claims never raised in
a state proceeding are waived for the purposes of federal review
unless the prisoner can show both cause for the default and actual
prejudice therefrom. 70 While the Court left open the precise
formulation of the "cause and prejudice" standard, it conceded that
the standard was much narrower than the Fay standard, in which a
defaulted state claim was presumed not to be waived absent a
deliberate bypass of the state court.'7 ' The Sykes Court wanted to
afford greater respect to the finality of state decisions-to make the
state trial the" 'main event' ... rather than a 'tryout on the road' for
what will later be the determinative federal habeas hearing."172 The
Sykes Court also was concerned with federal respect for state
procedural law. The Court reasoned that if the federal courts
entertain claims that were not brought in state courts, then state
courts might be less likely to enforce their own procedural
requirements. Rather than treat claims as barred due to procedural
default, state courts might instead choose to hear them on the merits,
so as to give the federal court the benefit of a state courts' view
before the federal court adjudicates such a claim. 73 The Sykes Court
also was concerned with sandbagging, or deliberately withholding an
objection in state court with the intent of entering federal court if
convicted. 74
majority's decision in Sykes for its concern with defendants bypassing the state courts
because defendants "simply have no incentive to slight the state tribunal because
constitutional adjudication on the state and federal levels are not mutually exclusive").
The great majority of defaulted claims are the result of inadvertence and ineffective
counsel. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 104 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
16& See Fay, 372 U.S. at 433-34.
169. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 90-91.
170. See id at 87.
171. See id.
172. See id- at 90.
173. See id. at 89-90.
174. See id at 89. Justice Brennan, however, objected that there is in reality very little
incentive for prisoners to bypass intentionally the state adjudication of federal claims. See
id. at 103 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, supra note 125, at 99
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Just as important as Sykes's newfound deference to the finality of
state court adjudications of federal law was its formulation of
"adequate independent state basis" as the justification for procedural
default. 75 Adequate independent state basis means that if a prisoner
raises a federal issue in state court but procedurally defaults on that
claim, the federal courts will consider the state procedural ruling to be
an adequate independent basis that bars federal review.' 6 On the
other hand, if the prisoner never raised a federal claim in state court,
the state court had no opportunity to make a judgment on an
independent basis-substantive or procedural. The federal courts in
such cases will apply state procedural law to determine if the claims
would have been defaulted had they been raised. In effect, a federal
court reconstructs state procedural law to determine if there would
have been an adequate independent basis to support a state judgment
and preclude federal review.' Otherwise, the prisoner could
frustrate the procedural default rule enunciated in Sykes by simply
("It is [the ABA's Task Force] studied conclusion, based on the extensive testimony on
this question and our own experience, that capital trial and appellate lawyers rarely
engage in the practice of sandbagging."). The temptation to sandbag would be even less in
noncapital cases because the defendants have no interest in stalling state court
proceedings. Interestingly, Fay's deliberate bypass test addressed the sandbagging
concern by not allowing federal review of claims that had been withheld deliberately from
the state court for tactical reasons. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439 (1963), overruled in
part by Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). This raises the issue as to whether the
Court's concern with sandbagging was disingenuous given the subsequent extension of the
cause and prejudice standard to claims defaulted inadvertently. See Murray v. Carrier, 477
U.S. 478, 488-92, 495 (1986) (balancing the state's interests against the possibility of unjust
incarceration).
175. The Court framed the issue as whether the well-established rule that "a state
decision resting on an adequate foundation of state substantive law is immune from review
in the federal courts" applies to state procedural law as well. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 81-82; see
also Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260 (1989) (indicating that the Sykes procedural default
rule "has its historical and theoretical basis in the 'adequate and independent state
ground' doctrine" (quoting Sykes, 433 U.S. at 81)). The Court indicated again in 1991 that
a claim is defaulted procedurally if the state decision rests on a principle of state
procedural law that is independent of the federal question. See Coleman v. Thompson,
501 U.S. 722,729 (1991) (holding that a state appeal that was late by one day constituted a
state procedural default that barred federal review). For interesting accounts of
Coleman's actual innocence, see JOHN C. TUCKER, MAY GOD HAVE MERCY: A TRUE
STORY OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT passim (1997); Smolowe, supra note 6, at 40; and
John Tucker, Dead End; Roger Coleman vs. William Rehnquist, NEW REPUBLIC, May 4,
1992, at 21, 21.
176. State court decisions that are ambiguous as to whether they are based on a
procedural default are reviewable in federal court. See Harris, 489 U.S. at 263. Federal
review is precluded only by a plain statement of procedural default by the state court. See
id.
177. See id. at 269-70 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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refusing to bring federal claims in state court.178 This formulation by
the Sykes court overruled Fay, which had held the "adequate
independent basis" doctrine to be inapplicable to state procedural
law.
7 9
In light of this background law, O'Sullivan raises a number of
issues relating to exhaustion and procedural default. Justice
O'Connor's analysis in O'Sullivan represents a significant departure
from the traditional notion of exhaustion. She conceded that
Boerckel had no available state remedies at the time the habeas
petition was heard, but nevertheless held that his claims had not been
exhausted."8 Rather than asking whether there were any available
state remedies existing at the time of the petition, Justice O'Connor
asked whether there ever had been any available state remedies.
Because there had been such a remedy available to Boerckel at one
time, his federal claims were not exhausted and, therefore, were
defaulted for the purposes of federal review. Justice O'Connor's
analysis, then, equates exhaustion with procedural default.181
As Justice Stevens recognized in his dissent, by conflating
exhaustion and procedural default, the majority radically departed
from traditional case law and congressional statutes that have
determined the two doctrines to be distinct.1 2 From its inception in
Ex parte Royall,'83 the exhaustion requirement has existed to prevent
the federal courts from interrupting state criminal proceedings' 84 and
has barred federal courts from adjudicating federal claims until a
state's highest court has disposed of the legal issues in each case.'8
Absent extraordinary circumstances, the federal courts will not hear a
prisoner's habeas petition so long as the prisoner has an available
178. See id.
179. See Fay, 372 U.S. at 429-34. According to Fay, the "adequate independent basis"
doctrine serves only to prevent the Supreme Court from issuing advisory opinions.
Therefore, this doctrine is not properly applied to state decisions resting on procedural
grounds. See id. at 429-30.
180. See O'Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. at 1734.
181. Recall that this was the approach in Daniels v. Allen. See supra notes 152-60.
182. See O'Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. at 1735-38 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
183. 117 U.S. 241 (1886).
184. Id. at 251-53; supra notes 97-104 and accompanying text.
185. See Urquhart v. Brown, 205 U.S. 179, 181-82 (1906); supra notes 97-104 and
accompanying text. Before Fay v. Noia, the exhaustion requirement applied also to writ
of error and certiorari review by the Supreme Court. See Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200,
208, 217 (1950), overruled in part by Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), overruled in part by
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). In any event, the exhaustion requirement always
has been concerned with the interruption of lower federal judges in the normal course of
review of state judgments. See supra notes 97-112 and accompanying text.
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state remedy.1' If the prisoner does not have an available state
remedy, then the exhaustion requirement has been met, and the
federal court may review the claim." Case law and the habeas
statute itself indicate that the exhaustion doctrine is a matter of
timing rather than a matter of preclusion. 8'
The issue in O'Sullivan is properly framed not as a question of
exhaustion but rather of procedural default. 89 Wainwright v. Sykes
established that the procedural default rule is based on the "adequate
independent basis" theory. 90 In the event that a state court is not
afforded an opportunity to adjudicate a federal claim, the federal
court must apply state procedural law to the claim to determine
whether the prisoner would have been in violation of state procedural
rules if she had raised the claim. 191  If not, then the claim is not
procedurally defaulted for the purposes of federal review. Applying
this analysis to O'Sullivan suggests that Boerckel had not
procedurally defaulted his claims by failing to raise them before the
Illinois Supreme Court. In Illinois, claims not raised in a petition for
discretionary review to the state's supreme court are not dismissed in
state habeas proceedings on a procedural default theory. 92 That is to
say, according to state law, failing to raise an issue on discretionary
review does not constitute a waiver of the claim for the purposes of
state post-conviction remedies. 93 Because Illinois does not regard the
186. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (Supp. III 1997); O'Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. at 1736 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
187. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B)(i); O'Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. at 1736 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
188. See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text (discussing the 1948 congressional
amendments to the habeas statute that incorporated the exhaustion requirement); supra
notes 97-138 and accompanying text (discussing the judicial history of the exhaustion
requirement).
189. See O'Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. at 1735 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
190. See supra notes 175-79 and accompanying text. The Court's view in O'Sullivan
that exhaustion and procedural default are essentially identical may represent a departure
from the well-settled "adequate independent basis" theory of procedural default and a
return to the 'exhaustion' theory of procedural default as enunciated in Daniels v. Allen,
344 U.S. 443, 487 (1953). See supra notes 152-60 and accompanying text.
191. See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255,269-70 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring); supra
note 177 and accompanying text.
192. Gomez v. Acevedo, 106 F.3d 192,196 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated, 522 U.S. 801 (1997);
People v. Roberts, 387 N.E.2d 331, 335 (Ill. 1979); People v. Peeples, 539 N.E.2d 1376,
1377 (Ill. Ct. App. 1989).
193. Rather, if the Illinois Court of Appeals has adjudicated the claim, the state habeas
claim is barred on a res judicata theory. See Gomez, 106 F.3d at 196. The distinction
between res judicata and waiver as the rationale for barring further state review is
significant because claims considered defaulted by the state court are precluded from
federal review, whereas claims considered res judicata are not. See id.; see also Brown v.
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failure to raise a claim on discretionary review as a procedural bar,
federal courts should hear such claims.194
Furthermore, had the Court properly framed the issue, Sykes
would have required that the Court determine whether there was
sufficient cause for Boerckel's default and whether he suffered actual
prejudice therefrom. 95 Had the Court performed the Sykes test, it
might have excused Boerckel's failure to raise his claim in his petition
for discretionary review. The Illinois statute discourages prisoners
from presenting the supreme court with ordinary federal claims.'96
Under the state's statute, the supreme court exercises discretion as to
the claims considered, specifically looking at the importance of the
question presented, the degree of conflict between the decision to be
reviewed and other state supreme court or appellate court decisions,
"the need for the exercise of the Supreme Court's supervisory
authority[,] and the final or interlocutory nature of the judgment
sought to be reviewed."'" Boerckel understandably read the rule as
discouraging all claims but those of broad significance. 98 Boerckel's
attempt to respect the procedural rules of Illinois was likely sufficient
cause for the alleged default. Moreover, Boerckel may well have
suffered actual prejudice from the federal court's failure to hear his
state claim. Boerckel presented evidence to the district court that he
was innocent of the offenses for which he had been convicted and that
two other men were in fact responsible for the crimes for which he
was accused. 19 9 Whether or not Boerckel would have satisfied the
cause and prejudice standard of Sykes, the Court simply failed to
Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 457-59 (1953) (holding that state judgments on the merits never
preclude federal review).
194. See supra notes 192-93.
195. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977). Sykes held that claims defaulted
in the state proceedings would be considered defaulted for the purposes of federal review
unless the prisoner could show cause for the default and show that he suffered actual
prejudice therefrom. See id.; supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
196. See ILL. S. Cr. RULE 315(a) (West 1993); supra note 26. Rule 315(a) governs civil
appeals but is made applicable to criminal appeals by ILL. S. Cr. RULE 612(b) (West
1993).
197. See ILL. S. Cr. RULE 315(a) (West 1993).
198. See O'Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. at 1733.
199. See id. at 1731. The Court has carved out an exception to the cause and prejudice
doctrine in cases of successive petitions when there is "a colorable showing of factual
innocence." Kuhlman v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454 (1986). Likewise, the Court has held
that actual innocence exempts the defendant from the showing of cause and prejudice
ordinarily required when a claim has been procedurally defaulted. See Murray v. Carrier,
477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986). In framing the issue incorrectly as one of exhaustion, the Court
also avoided the issue of whether O'Sullivan's claim of factual innocence exempted him
from the Sykes test altogether.
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reach the question because it incorrectly framed the issue in
O'Sullivan as one of exhaustion.
As this discussion shows, the majority's analysis cannot be
justified by the existing case law on exhaustion and procedural
default. The decision demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding
of the exhaustion requirement.2 Justice O'Connor's misapplication
of the exhaustion requirement led the majority to conclude
incorrectly that Boerckel's claims were defaulted for the purposes of
federal review and accounted for the majority's failure to apply the
cause and prejudice test of Sykes.
Even assuming arguendo that the Court had properly framed
O'Sullivan as an exhaustion issue, the Court's strict application of the
exhaustion requirement itself also represents a significant departure
from existing case law. As the Court has held in previous decisions,
the application of the exhaustion requirement should be animated by
the principles of comity and federalism. 01  If the exhaustion
requirement at any point frustrates the principles of comity and
federalism, then the Court should not insist upon its application. The
O'Sullivan decision, however, appears to derogate this historic
commitment to federalism and comity.
The holding does not discourage the federal courts from
interrupting state court adjudication of federal law because Illinois
considers issues resolved at trial and reviewed on appeal as res
judicata for the purposes of further review.2 ° Once the appeals court
has passed on the issue, the issue is considered fully adjudicated.
Rule 315(b) of the Illinois Supreme Court Rules supports this view in
that discretionary review is reserved for issues of broad significance; it
is not construed as a mechanism for the review of garden-variety
federal claims?03 Because Illinois considers federal matters fully
adjudicated after the court of appeals has ruled, it follows that the
holding in O'Sullivan is not based on the Court's desire to afford the
state an opportunity to adjudicate federal claims.
The holding in O'Sullivan also does not promote judicial
efficiency.2 4 In this instance, the state court had an opportunity to
200. Justice O'Connor construes the exhaustion requirement to be preclusive. See
supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
201. See Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 134 (1987); Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit
Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484,490 (1973); supra notes 121-37 and accompanying text.
202. See O'Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. at 1739; Gomez v. Acevedo, 106 F.3d 192, 195-96 (7th
Cir. 1997), vacated, 522 U.S. 801 (1997); People v. Roberts, 387 N.E.2d 331, 335 (Ill. 1979);
People v. Peoples, 539 N.E.2d 1376,1377 (Il. App. 1989);.
203. See ILL. S. Cr. RULE 315(a) (West 1993).
204. Procedural default is based in part on concerns of efficiency. Inasmuch as the
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dispose of the matter when Boerckel raised his claims on direct
appeal.205 The Court has recognized, however, that a state prisoner
need not avail himself of every conceivable state remedy to avoid a
procedural default. All that is required is that the state be afforded
a fair opportunity to adjudicate the federal claim. According to
Illinois, the state fully adjudicated Boerckel's federal claims on direct
appeal.27 Bouncing a federal claim back to the state court-a claim
considered by the state court to be res judicata-can hardly promote
efficiency for the state or federal systems.218  Moreover, the state
supreme courts that want to reserve discretionary review for truly
extraordinary claims potentially will be deluged with unwanted and
time-consuming federal claims.2 9
Finally, the holding does not encourage the competent state
adjudication of federal law. Because of the page limitations of the
petitions to state supreme courts, O'Sullivan may force prisoners to
choose between shortchanging their extraordinary claims and
preserving garden-variety federal claims. As a result, even the
extraordinary claims may not be competently adjudicated by the
state's high court. The Supreme Court's desire, then, that all claims
be adjudicated on discretionary review, could instead ensure that no
federal claims receive a fair hearing. Thus, the Supreme Court's
invitation to the states to adjudicate competently federal law is
disingenuous.21 0 More importantly, inasmuch as state courts cannot
state court may grant relief on the federal claim, it decreases the burden on the federal
courts. See Ex parte Spencer, 228 U.S. 652, 659 (1913); supra note 143 and accompanying
text.
205. See O'Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. at 1734.
206. See id. at 1737-38 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Wilwording v. Swenson, 404
U.S. 249, 249-50, 252 (1971) (per curiam) (holding that state prisoners are not required to
seek generally unsuccessful state remedies); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 447 (1953)
(state prisoners need not seek collateral review).
207. See O'Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. at 1739 (Stevens, J., dissenting); O'Sullivan v. Boerckel,
135 F.3d 1194, 1200 (7th Cir. 1998), cert granted, 525 U.S. 1999 (1998), rev'd, 119 S. Ct.
1728 (1999); Gomez, 106 F.3d at 195-96.
208. A similar rationale motivated Justice Blackmun's concurrence in Rose v. Lundy.
455 U.S. 509,525 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). The Rose rule, which
requires federal courts to remit frivolous unexhausted claims to state court when a
petitioner has meritorious exhausted claims, simply drains state judicial resources. See id.
(Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). State attention to these claims would be
purely academic; because the claims are not meritorious, efficiency demands that the
federal courts dispense with them in the first instance. See id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in
the judgment).
209. See O'Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. at 1733. The O'Sullivan rule encourages defendants to
clog state court dockets with disfavored matters unlikely to be considered by the state
court. See Editorial, One More Bad Habeas Law, WASH. POST, June 9,1999, at A24.
210. See O'Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. at 1732 (reiterating that the exhaustion requirement is
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competently adjudicate federal law, they cannot reliably ease the
burden on the federal courts.2 '
Sykes indicated that the interests of comity and federalism
necessitate that the federal courts respect state procedural law. Yet,
the decision in O'Sullivan undermines comity and federalism interests
inasmuch as it disrespects state procedural law. Illinois has indicated
that, generally, discretionary review is to be a forum for the review of
extraordinary claims 12 Subsequent to O'Sullivan, the state prisoner
must choose whether to follow Illinois procedural law, thereby
defaulting his claims in federal court, or whether to disregard state
law, thereby making federal review possible. Furthermore, states
may be encouraged to violate their own procedural rules by hearing
ordinary claims on their merits in an effort to offer guidance to the
federal courts. Also, if a state court routinely hears otherwise
defaulted claims on the merits, there is even less incentive for
defendants to respect the state's procedural rules.
Nor does the holding in O'Sullivan discourage sandbagging.
Sykes, as well as Fay, highlighted the federal interest of discouraging
sandbagging-the deliberate bypass of state procedure with the aim
of entering federal court in the event of conviction 13 Commentators,
however, have observed repeatedly that the fear of sandbagging in
Sykes is unfounded. Because the state and federal proceedings are
not mutually exclusive, 14 it is simply not in a defendant's interest to
withhold a claim from the state courts 5 By avoiding the state court,
"designed to give the state courts a full and fair opportunity to resolve federal
constitutional claims").
211. See Ex parte Spencer, 228 U.S. 652, 660 (1913) (remarking that state court
adjudication of federal law efficiently dispenses with many federal claims before they
reach federal court).
212. See ILL. S. Cr. RULE 315(a) (West 1993).
213. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72,89 (1977).
214. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443,458 (1953).
215. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 382 n.7 (1986) ("No reasonable lawyer
would forego competent litigation of meritorious, possibly decisive claims on the remote
chance that his deliberate dereliction might ultimately result in federal habeas review.");
Sykes, 433 U.S. at 103 (Brennan J., dissenting) ("In the ordinary case, litigants simply have
no incentive to slight the state tribunal, since constitutional adjudication on the state and
federal levels are not mutually exclusive."); Habeas Corpus Legislation: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Admin. of Justice of the Comm. on
the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 461 (1991) (Sup. Does. No. Y4.J89/1:101/145) (statement of
Larry W. Yackle) ("sandbagging is largely a myth"); AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, supra note
125, at 99 (explaining that appellate lawyers rarely engage in the practice of sandbagging);
Erwin Chemerinsky, Thinking About Habeas Corpus, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 748, 790
(1987) ("[C]oncerns about attorney's sandbagging arguments have been given far too
much weight in decisions and discussions concerning the scope of habeas review.");
Graham Hughes, Sandbagging Constitutional Rights: Federal Habeas Corpus and the
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the prisoner loses a valuable opportunity to have the federal claim
adjudicated and with it a valuable opportunity for freedom. 216 Even
assuming arguendo that the sandbagging interest has a basis in fact, it
certainly is not relevant to O'Sullivan. Presumably, sandbagging only
offends federalism when the prisoner bypasses a state remedy that
would have afforded the state an opportunity to adjudicate the claim.
In this instance, the state, by its own standards, had a full opportunity
to adjudicate the federal claims-on direct review with the court of
appeals.2 17 Because Illinois views adjudication by the court of appeals
as res judicata, Boerckel did not sandbag his way into federal court.
The rebuttable presumption, developed by O'Sullivan, that
claims not raised on petition for discretionary review are defaulted
for the purposes of federal review also denigrates state autonomy.18
There are apparently two ways that a state may reverse the
presumption of default. First, the state may expressly indicate that
review by the state's highest court is not available for specific
claims 9 Such a refusal to entertain a certain kind of claim renders
supreme court review unavailable and, therefore, a failure to raise it
on discretionary review would not violate the exhaustion
requirement.' Secondly, a state may place a judicial gloss on
Procedural Default Principle, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 321, 336 (1987-1988)
(indicating that sandbagging is not likely to occur very frequently); Donald P. Lay, The
Writ of Habeas Corpus: A Complex Procedure for a Simple Process, 77 MINN. L. REV.
1015, 1032 n.92 (1993) (indicating that the sandbagging argument is superficial); Judith
Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 837, 896-98 (1984) (arguing that the court's reliance on
sandbagging arguments is unpersuasive).
216. See Chemerinsky, supra note 215, at 791.
217. See O'Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. at 1740 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Boerckel v.
O'Sullivan, 135 F.3d 1194, 1201-02 (7th Cir. 1998), cert granted, 525 U.S. 1999 (1998),
rev'd, 119 S. Ct. 1728 (1999)); see also Gomez v. Acevedo, 106 F.3d 192, 195-96 (7th Cir.
1997) (noting that "'[d]eterminations of the reviewing court on direct appeal are res
judicata as to issues actually decided and issues that could have been raised on direct
appeal but were not are waived' "in Illinois (quoting People v. Coleman, 660 N.E.2d 919,
927 (Ill. 1995))), vacated, 522 U.S. 801 (1997).
218. See O'Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. at 1734; see also supra note 34 and accompanying text
(noting that states may reverse the default presumption if they explicitly indicate that
discretionary review is not available for such claims).
219. The Illinois Assistant Attorney General, William L. Browers, advocated this
position at oral argument. According to Browers, absent a clear statement that the state
simply will not hear a particular claim, the defendant ought be required to raise the claim
on discretionary review in order to preserve it for federal habeas. See Transcript of Oral
Arguments Before the Supreme Court at 3-24, O'Sullivan (No. 97-2048).
220. Recall that the exhaustion requirement has not been satisfied if the defendant
"has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question
presented." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c) (1994) (emphasis added) (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 (Supp. 1111997)); see also O'Sullivan, 119 S. Ct. at 1734 (noting that the exhaustion
requirement "turns on an inquiry into what procedures are 'available' under state law");
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supreme court discretionary review to indicate that review by the
state supreme court is not required in order to satisfy the exhaustion
requirement.22' Given the O'Sullivan presumption requiring
exhaustion, if a discretionary review state does not modify its rules,
then state prisoners will be encouraged to deluge the state supreme
court with unwanted garden-variety claims. If the state desires to
avoid these unwanted claims, it may sacrifice the discretionary nature
of its docket or it may judicially dispense with the exhaustion
requirement altogether and open wide the federal district court
doorsPm It should be noted that a state like Illinois may not express a
general preference for extraordinary claims and a concomitant
exhaustion requirement for only those extraordinary claims.p
Forcing the states to re-invent the discretionary system of review
hardly respects state autonomy.
Because O'Sullivan is grounded neither in the existing case law
on exhaustion and procedural default nor in traditional notions of
comity and federalism, the most likely explanation for the holding
appears to be general judicial hostility toward the writ of habeas
corpus. Certainly, there has been no shortage of extra-judicial
activism against the writ. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Powell, and
Justice O'Connor have remarked numerous times off the bench that,
because of excessive federal review, state death sentences are not
carried out quickly enough z 4 Chief Justice Rehnquist organized a
supra note 35 (indicating that the Court has not interpreted this provision literally).
221. See, e.g., State v. Sandon, 777 P.2d 220, 221 (Ariz. 1989) (per curiam) (en bane)
(holding that defendants do not have to raise all possible issues upon discretionary review
to the Arizona Supreme Court in order to exhaust state remedies); In re Exhaustion of
State Remedies in Criminal and Post-Conviction Relief Cases, 471 S.E.2d 454, 454 (S.C.
1990) (declaring that litigants are not required to petition for rehearing and certiorari after
adverse appellate court rulings to exhaust all available state remedies).
222 Forcing the states to choose between a deluge of unwanted claims and sacrificing
discretionary review or dispensing with the exhaustion requirement creates something of a
conflict of interest within the state itself. To be sure, the District Attorney's office would
favor a harsh exhaustion rule, caring little about the ability of the state judiciary to handle
unwanted claims. The state judiciary, on the other hand, may favor abandoning the
discretionary docket or dispensing with the exhaustion requirement in an effort to
preserve the efficient administration of justice. See Transcript of Oral Arguments Before
the Supreme Court at 12-16, O'Sullivan (No. 97-2048).
223. One of the Justices at oral argument suggested the more sensible rule when the
Justice asked Mr. Browers the following: when a state indicates "what it is interested in,
why shouldn't the rule be that if your case does not fall within the kinds of examples that
the State supreme court says that it's interested in, you don't have to exhaust because it
would be futile to do it, or almost always futile?" Id. at 9.
224. See Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Commentary: Capital Punishment, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 1035, 1035 (1989); Ronald J. Tabak & J. Mark Lane, Judicial Activism and
Legislative "Reform" of Federal Habeas Corpus: A Critical Analysis of Recent
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committee of five judges to review federal post-conviction procedure
in capital cases and to make recommendations for reform.ms The
committee's recommendations were not surprising given the
committee's unanimous predilection to dismantle habeas review in
capital cases and its refusal to hold hearings or interview
witnesses.m The committee reforms were not, however, adopted by
Congress, despite considerable pressure from the Chief Justice.?
Throughout 1991, both Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
O'Connor advocated federal habeas corpus reform.229 Congress
finally altered the nature of habeas relief in 1996 with the passage of
the AEDPA. Still the Chief Justice was dissatisfied in his 1998 year-
end report of the federal judiciary, bemoaning the increased numbers
of filings in federal courts.2Y0 The Chief Justice praised congressional
efforts to curb the availability of the writ, but complained that such
reforms were" 'sporadic and inconsistent.' "231
If, in fact, the O'Sullivan Court was influenced by its own
attitude toward habeas corpus in general, then the Court violated the
venerable separation-of-powers principle that courts should not
Developments and Current Proposals, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1, 5 n.6 (1991) (citing Remarks of
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, American Law Institute Annual Meeting (May 15,
1990); Remarks of Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, National Conference of State
Court Chief Justices (Jan. 27, 1988); Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Remarks at the
American Bar Association Mid-year Meeting (Feb. 6, 1989); Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor, Remarks at the Attorney General's Crime Summit (Mar. 4, 1991)); Marcia
Coyle et al., Rehnquist Is Still Hoping for Habeas 'Reform', NAT'L LJ., Jan, 14, 1991, at 5.
225. See Tabak & Lane, supra note 224, at 56-57; AD Hoc COMMITrEE ON FEDERAL
HABEAS CORPUS IN CAPITAL CASES, REPORT ON HABEAS CORPUS IN CAPITAL CASES,
reprinted in 45 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 3239 (Sept. 27, 1989). Justice Powell, who chaired
the committee, was outspoken in his desire to reform post-conviction review of criminal
convictions because of its tendency to delay executions. See Powell, supra note 224, at
1045-46 (reporting a speech delivered before the Criminal Justice Section of the American
Bar Association on August 7, 1988).
226. See Tabak & Lane, supra note 224, at 57.
227. See id. at 58.
228. After submitting the reforms to the Judicial Conference, the Conference voted to
defer sending the reforms to Congress until the entire federal judiciary could review the
proposed reforms. See Marcia Coyle et al., Judges Spar at Hearing over Powell Report,
NAT'L L.J., Nov. 20, 1989, at 5. Rather than defer, Chief Justice Rehnquist sent the
proposed reforms to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees. See Powell Committee
Proposals Put on the Fast Track in Senate Against Judges' Wishes, 46 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA)
1043 (Oct. 11, 1989). When the Conference finally did consider the Committee proposals,
it rejected them. See Linda Greenhouse, Vote Is Rebuff for Chief Justice, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 15, 1990, at A16; The Politics of Death, ECONOMIST, Mar. 24, 1990, at 25,25.
229. See Tabak & Lane, supra note 224, at 57 n.6.
230. See Harvey Berkman, High Court Chief Takes Stock of Year, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 12,
1998, at A9.
231. Id. (quoting Chief Justice Rehnquist).
[Vol. 781638
HABEAS CORPUS
engage in policymaking.2 2  The federal writ of habeas corpus is a
statutory remedy. It was first promulgated by Congress in 1789 and
has been the subject of congressional reform ever since.23 Congress
has carefully controlled the scope of federal jurisdiction, insulating
the states in 17891 and granting maximum jurisdiction to the federal
courts in 1867P-1 Congress has instituted reforms aimed at advancing
comity interests"6 and reforms designed to reduce the burden on the
federal judiciary."7 It has at times underscored the importance of
addressing federal claims in a federal forum,238 while at other times
has afforded greater finality to state adjudications of federal law.3 9 In
short, Congress has demonstrated its ability to determine federal
habeas policy.2A
When it codified the exhaustion requirement, Congress clearly
intended that exhaustion be a matter of timing and not a matter of
preclusion. By substituting its own view of exhaustion for Congress's
view, the O'Sullivan Court has improperly exercised a legislative
power by, in effect, amending the statute.241 The Court also has
232. O'Sullivan is not the first case in which the Court has been accused of legislating
from the bench regarding habeas corpus. See, e.g., Schiup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 342-43
(1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (accusing the Court of substituting its own notion of fairness
for what the statute says and underscoring the notion that habeas corpus is a statutory
remedy); McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 516-17 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the Court for taking on a legislative role); Ronald J. Tabak, Habeas Corpus as
Crucial Protector of Constitutional Rights: A Tribute Which May Also Be a Eulogy, 26
SETON HALL L. REV. 1477, 1483-89 (1996) (describing notable instances of judicial
habeas corpus legislation); Tabak & Lane, supra note 224, at 4-5 (indicating that the
Rehnquist Court has eliminated the writ for death row inmates without any congressional
mandate); Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Puts Sharp Curbs on Repeated Death Row
Appeals, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1991, at Al (noting Justice Marshall's dissent in McClesky
v. Zant, which accused the majority of the Court of exercising legislative power); Richard
Lacayo, Right Face!: In the Final Stretch of the Term, a Conservative Majority Solidifies Its
Hold on the Supreme Court and Prepares an Assault on the Warren Legacy, TIME, July 1,
1991, at 20, 22-23 (characterizing McClesky as legislation from the bench in response to
Chief Justice Rehnquist's failed effort to lobby Congress to streamline the death penalty);
Non Habeas Corpus: The Supreme Court, ECONOMIST, May 16, 1992, at 28, 28 (labeling
the Court's recent habeas policy as "the sort of judicial activism that conservatives have
deplored ever since the 1960s").
233. See supra notes 42-92 and accompanying text (describing the congressional
development of the writ).
234. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text (discussing the Act of 1789).
235. See supra note 52-59 and accompanying text (discussing the 1867 Act).
236. See supra notes 81-92 and accompanying text (discussing the AEDPA).
237. See supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text (discussing the 1966 amendments).
238 See supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text (discussing the 1867 Act).
239. See supra notes 81-92 and accompanying text (discussing the AEDPA).
240. See supra notes 42-92 (discussing the congressional development of habeas
policy).
241. It is "axiomatic that this Court does not function as a backup legislature for the
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disregarded the interests served by the vindication of federal law by a
federal forum. Congress underscored the importance of providing a
federal forum for the litigation of federal rights when it extended the
scope of habeas corpus to all state prisoners in 1867.242 Legislators
never have questioned the importance of a federal forum for the
litigation of federal claims, despite numerous congressional revisions
of federal habeas corpus law.243 Moreover, the Court itself has
repeatedly acknowledged the importance of a federal forum for the
litigation of federal constitutional rights.2" Professor Yackle argues
persuasively that both the Constitution and congressional enactments,
including §§ 1331245 and 1441246 of the United States Code, establish
the predicates for a general right to litigate federal claims in a federal
court.2u 7
reconsideration of failed attempts to amend existing statutes." McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S.
467,516 (1991).
242. See supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text (discussing the expansion of habeas
corpus in 1867 and the importance of the federal vindication of federal rights).
243. But see Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
132, sec. 104(3), § 2254(d), 110 Stat. 1214, 1218-19 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (Supp.
III 1997)) (according greater finality to state court adjudication of federal law). Professors
Liebman and Ryan argue, however, that Congress in fact intended that the federal courts
could intervene not only if the states violate existing precedent, but also if they create an
unreasonable rule in the absence of Supreme Court rule. See supra notes 90-91 and
accompanying text. President Clinton further indicated upon signing the bill that any
interpretation of section 104(3) limiting a federal court's ability to make independent
judgments of federal law would be unconstitutional under Marbury v. Madison. See supra
note 89.
244. See Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 324 (1996) (relying upon Ex parte Yerger,
75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 95 (1869), and remarking that federal habeas corpus is an important
protector of human freedom and that its demise "risk[s] injury to an important interest in
human liberty"); Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (indicating that habeas corpus is
designed to " 'interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians
of the people's federal rights' " (quoting Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972)); Fay
v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391,424 (1963) ("[Tjhe manifest federal policy that federal constitutional
rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary
federal judicial review."), overruled in part by Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977);
Brown v. Allen, 334 U.S. 443, 458 (1953) (indicating that state courts and federal courts
are not fungible and that state court adjudications of federal law are not res judicata for
the purposes of federal habeas corpus review); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264,
415-16 (1821) (explaining the necessity for the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction
over all cases arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States,
including cases originally decided in state courts).
245. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994) (giving federal district courts original jurisdiction over "all
civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States").
246. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1994) (providing for the removal of federal questions to federal
court).
247. Yackle, supra note 5, at 1026. There is an important gap in any supposed general
right to litigate federal claims in a federal forum-the lack of a right to litigate federal
defenses in federal court unless the plaintiff could have litigated in federal court in the first
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Whether to allow access to a federal forum for federal claims is
not just a matter of policy but of ensuring basic fairness. Inasmuch as
the federal courts are not tied to the enforcement of the substantive
criminal law, they are better situated to engage in the dispassionate
adjudication of federal rights. 48 Because policing federally mandated
procedural safeguards is often at odds with the enforcement of local
criminal law, the duty is best left to the more independent federal
judiciary.2 49 Professors Robert M. Cover and Alexander Aleinikoff
characterize the competing judicial positions of the state ahd federal
courts as pragmatic and utopian, respectively. 0 State courts are
generally pragmatic-they are primarily concerned with the efficient
administration of criminal justice and ultimately in the outcome of the
decision.25 The states are inclined to interpret loosely or to eliminate
altogether constitutional impediments that "hinder efficient
assembly-line processes. ' 12
The federal courts are more likely utopian253 because of the
instance. According to Professor Yackle, efforts to reform this anomaly in the law are
largely uncontroversial. See id, at 1028-29.
248. See id. at 1022-23. Because most state judges are elected, they are in no position
to safeguard the unpopular constitutional rights of criminal defendants. See Stephen B.
Bright, Is Fairness Irrelevant?: The Evisceration of Federal Habeas Corpus Review and
Limits on the Ability of the State Courts to Protect Fundamental Rights, 54 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1, 10-17 (1997) (discussing different judges who were voted off their respective
benches in retaliation for politically unpopular death penalty decisions); Stephen B. Bright
& Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death. Deciding Between the Bill of Rights
and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759, 834 (1995) ("The lack of
electoral clout of those facing the death penalty makes the political question easy;
however, the cost to justice and the rule of law is significant."); Symposium, Politics and
the Death Penalty: Can Rational Discourse and Due Process Survive the Perceived Political
Pressure?, 21 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 239, 270-73 (1994) (including comments by former
North Carolina Chief Justice James G. Exum noting the difficulties elected judges face in
the re-election process if they sometimes overturn death sentences); see also Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1 Wheat.), 347 (1816) ("[S]tate attachments, state
prejudices, state jealousies, and state interests might sometimes obstruct, or control, or be
supposed to obstruct or control, the regular administration of justice.").
249. See Yackle, supra note 5, at 1040; see also Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90
HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1131 (1977) (arguing that only the federal courts are in a position
consistently to enforce countermajoritarian checks and consequently to protect
constitutional rights); Peller, supra note 52, at 665 (arguing that the Court's own
assumption of parity in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493-94 n.35 (1976), is undermined by
its collateral review of guilt-related claims).
250. See Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas
Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035,1050 (1977).
251. See id. at 1051.
252. I.
253. See id. at 1050 ("The utopian approach to adjudication reads a more or less
comprehensive order of fair and limited government into the Constitution, usually
focusing on the Bill of Rights or some provision of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
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nature of their jurisdiction. Professors Cover and Aleinikoff note
that "[s]ince [federal courts] can overturn state convictions only on
constitutional grounds, they necessarily speak the language of
constitutional imperatives."' '  Because federal courts are not
concerned with enforcement of substantive criminal law, they likely
will enforce federal laws that may otherwise be unpopular in state
courts5 5 Consequently, litigating in a federal forum is crucial to the
fair adjudication of the state criminal defendant's federal claims.
In addition to being valuable for the criminal defendant, federal
habeas review remains a powerful vehicle for the reliable
interpretation of federal law. Federal habeas review, far from
disrespecting the state adjudication of federal law, encourages the
states to grapple with substantive federal issues on the merits rather
than disregarding them altogether or dismissing them on procedural
grounds. 56 Thus, federal habeas corpus facilitates a conversation
between state and federal courts that results in the cooperative
interpretation of federal law.257 Because the federal courts have the
power to release state prisoners, they influence the state courts to
respect federal adjudications of federal law.5  State courts are
encouraged to follow the federal courts' interpretation of federal law
or risk the further liberation of prisoners5 9 Yet, the state courts are
not bound by lower federal court interpretations of federal law to the
extent that those interpretations are not compelled by the Supreme
254. Id. at 1051.
255. See Yackle, supra note 5, at 1023, 1031-32. State courts are susceptible to a
hostility against Supreme Court decisions and consequently may be tempted not to
enforce such precedents. See, e.g., Jerry K. Beatty, State Court Evasion of United States
Supreme Court Mandates During the Last Decade of the Warren Court, 6 VAL. U. L. REV.
260 passim (1972); Ronald Schneider, State Court Evasion of United States Supreme Court
Mandates: A Reconsideration of the Evidence, 7 VAL. U. L. REV. 191 passim (1973).
256. In the absence of federal review, states may decide to disregard federal law in
their effort to enforce the substantive criminal law. See supra notes 248-52 and
accompanying text. Federal habeas review encourages states to adopt procedures to hear
federal claims on the merits. See Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 453 (1965) (noting
suggestions that the friction between federal and state courts "might be ameliorated" if
the states were to construe habeas corpus review "as affording them an opportunity to
provide ... for a full airing of federal claims"); Brennan, supra note 55, at 442; Daniel J.
Meador, Accommodating State Criminal Procedure and Federal Postconviction Review, 5
A.B.A. J. 928, 929 (1964) (suggesting that state courts can avoid federal habeas
intervention by hearing every claim asserted on the merits); Reitz, supra note 158, at
1352-54.
257. The cooperative theory is the central thesis of Professors Cover and Aleinikoff's
article. See Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 250, at 1048.
258. See id at 1052.
259. See id
[Vol. 781642
HABEAS CORPUS
Court.-m The mere fact that the majority of state criminal convictions
are not reviewed in federal court mitigates the persuasive effect of
federal review3 61 The refusal of a state to follow federal law in turn
influences how federal officials interpret federal law.262 The give and
take of two courts of concurrent jurisdiction result in a dialectical
federalism that respects state autonomy while at the same time
encouraging the uniform adjudication of federal law. The
conversation between the state and federal courts result in a more
perfect cooperative interpretation of federal laws.M
The rebuttable presumption in O'Sullivan that all federal claims
must be raised on discretionary review in order to satisfy the
exhaustion requirement also raises the question as to whether the
state or federal courts are better situated to promulgate the
procedural predicates to federal habeas review264  The rule in
O'Sullivan essentially gives the states the key to the federal district
court door. If discretionary review states like Illinois, which
indicate a preference for extraordinary claims, choose not to alter the
discretionary nature of the docket or to dispense explicitly with the
exhaustion requirement altogether, then those state prisoners who
follow the state procedural rules will be forbidden a hearing in a
federal forum.26 States like Illinois will open the federal forum to its
state prisoners if they are sufficiently aggravated by the deluge of
unwanted garden-variety claims inspired by the O'Sullivan opinion.
Because the states are concerned with the administration of the
substantive criminal law and the finality of state court criminal
judgments26 7 they will have no other incentive to allow state prisoners
260. The state courts are not bound by lower federal court interpretations of federal
law inasmuch as those interpretations are not compelled by the Supreme Court. See iii at
1053 (indicating that the state courts may refuse to follow federal law, frustrating the
federal courts' reformative efforts, thereby giving the federal courts incentive to satisfy
some of their demands). Professors Cover and Aleinikoff observe that often the state
courts deliberately ignore the federal courts' interpretations of federal law. See id,
261. See id. at 1052.
262. See id. at 1053 (indicating that the state courts may refuse to follow federal law,
frustrating the federal courts' reformative efforts, thereby giving the federal courts
incentive to satisfy some of their demands).
263. See id. at 1052.
264. See supra notes 218-23 and accompanying text (discussing the rebuttable
presumption enunciated in O'Sullivan).
265. See supra notes 218-23 and accompanying text (discussing the rebuttable
presumption enunciated in O'Sullivan).
266. See supra notes 218-23 and accompanying text (discussing the rebuttable
presumption enunciated in O'Sullivan).
267. See supra notes 248-52 and accompanying text (discussing the attachment of local
communities to the administration of the substantive criminal law and a corresponding
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access to a federal forum. Because the exhaustion requirement is a
federal question that should be decided by the federal courts,
2
leaving the states to determine whether claims will receive a federal
hearing is exactly backwards.269
In conclusion, the O'Sullivan decision is problematic because by
formulating its coterminous theory of exhaustion and procedural
default, it disregards the value of a federal forum for the litigation of
federal rights. Effectively, O'Sullivan all but forces states to adopt
explicit rules on claims considered under discretionary review. For
states that do not modify their rules, O'Sullivan will encourage state
prisoners to disregard state law and file unwanted petitions, thus,
seriously undermining the principles of federalism. To the extent that
states resist this federal pressure, however, a significant group of
federal claims may never be adjudicated. If states like Illinois do not
clarify their discretionary review rules, inexperienced attorneys and
pro se defendants likely will respect the state courts' preference for
extraordinary claims and, therefore, will default their garden-variety
federal claims. To the extent that the Court's inflexible rule in
O'Sullivan leaves constitutional claims unadjudicated, it undermines
the congressional writ of habeas corpus.
R. STEPHEN PAINTER, JR.
inability to dispassionately vindication of federal law).
268. See Jennison v. Goldsmith, 940 F.2d 1308, 1310-11 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam)
(rejecting the argument that states should be allowed to give prisoners the option of
bypassing state supreme courts and, thus, go directly to federal courts for habeas review).
The court explicitly indicated that while "the state may prescribe what remedies are
available to a prisoner alleging incarceration in violation of federal law ... , [ ] federal law
requires that any remedies made available by the state must be exhausted." Id. at 1311 n.4
(emphasis added).
269. According to Professor Yackle, "[p]rocedural standards for the benefit of criminal
defendants can safely be established and orchestrated at the national level, and, indeed,
should be uniform across the country." Yackle, supra note 5, at 1039. The substantive
criminal law, on the other hand, is best left to the individual states. Because the
substantive criminal law offers the most opportunity for oppression, it is appropriately
diffused across the states and not centralized in the federal government. See id. at 1036.
The Supreme Court has also recognized the importance of leaving procedural habeas
questions to be promulgated at the federal level. See Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314,
323, 324 (1996) (noting "the importance, '"in order to preclude individualized
enforcement of the Constitution in different parts of the Nation,"' of' "lay[ing] down as
specifically as the nature of the problem permits the standards or directions that should
govern the District Judges in the disposition of applications for habeas corpus by prisoners
under sentence of State Courts" '" (quoting McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 496 (1991)
(quoting Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443,501-02 (1953) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.)))).
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